


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21 JANUARY 1987

# West Europe Report



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21 JANUARY 1987

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## IMPACT OF LIGACHEV VISIT, MEETINGS, SPEECHES DISCUSSED

## Koivisto Secures Kekkonen Line

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Nov 86 p 3

[Article: Ligachev Thanks Koivisto for Securing Kekkonen's Line]

[Text] On Wednesday the "number two man" in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yegor Ligachev, thanked President Mauno Koivisto for ensuring the continuity and unchangingness of Finland's foreign policy line after President Urho Kekkonen.

Ligachev presented his thanks in the dinner speech that he held on the opening day of his Finland visit. The CPSU delegation will be a guest of the Social Democratic Party for 4 days.

The formulation used by Ligachev is regarded as an innovation. Up to now the Soviet Union has said that it appreciated Koivisto's announcement that he would continue the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and Koivisto's care for the development and strengthening of relations.

"We appreciate the fact that with the support of Finland's democratic forces President Mauno Koivisto in his functions as Finland's head of state has ensured the continuity and unchangingness of the line that is oriented towards friendship with the Soviet Union and in the shaping and strengthening of which his distinguished predecessor Urho Kekkonen played such a prominent role," Ligachev said.

In his arrival statement Ligachev urged that continuous care be given to the foundation of relations. He said that forbearance is needed in them to understand some idiosyncrasies of the other party.

On the opening day the CPSU and SPD [Social Democratic Party] delegations conducted party consultations in which the international situation and bilateral questions, including trade between Finland and the Soviet Union, were taken up.

On Thursday Ligachev will meet President Koivisto and Prime Minister Sorsa. Visits to the Diet and the Finland-Soviet Union Society are on the program on Wednesday.

## NNWFZ, Nordic Sea Exercise Limits

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Nov 86 p 3

[Article "'Kola Missiles Removed:' Ligachev Gave Impetus to the Zone Project with New Proposals; Support for Koivisto's Speech; Limits on Large Naval Exercises]

[Text] Yegor Ligachev, the "number two man" of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, announced on Thursday that the Soviet Union had already dismantled all its medium-range missiles installed on the Kola Peninsula and a considerable portion of those installed in the Leningrad and Baltic Sea military districts.

On Thursday in Helsinki Ligachev termed the decision to dismantle concrete evidence of the readiness previously proclaimed by the Soviet Union to consider measures affecting its own territory in connection with the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

In a press briefing Ligachev, who is in Finland as a guest of the Social Democrats, presented a four-point program that attempts to give political velocity to the zone project, which is progressing slowly. He announced that the Soviet Union is now awaiting the reaction of others.

In addition the Soviet Union has removed several missile divisions from Leningrad and the Baltic Sea military districts, Ligachev said.

He also presented the limitation of naval exercises involving more than 25,000 men in Nordic waters and confirmed the earlier Soviet position on removing Golf class nuclear submarines from the Baltic Sea, if the zone project comes to fruition.

On Thursday the CPSU for the first time officially acknowledged through Ligachev's words that the Finnish Communists had split in two parts. He said that the CPSU was disturbed by the split and related evenly to both parties. According to Ligachev the CPSU does not set itself up as a mediator of other people's disputes.

On Thursday Ligachev met President Koivisto and Prime Minister Sorsa (Social Democratic Party). On Saturday he will meet the leadership of the Communist Party of Finland, the Taistoite party and the Center Party.

Photo caption: Yegor Ligachev (on the right) announced the Soviet Union's new proposals in Helsinki. On the left the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Finland, Kalevi Sorsa.

## Cautious, Positive Reception

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Nov 86 p 3

[Article: The Nordic Countries Receive Ligachev's Announcement Positively but

Cautiously]

[Text] The announcement made in Helsinki by Soviet leader Yegor Ligachev of the Soviet Union's measures for the benefit of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone were received positively but cautiously in the Nordic countries. The Swedish Foreign Ministry interpreted Ligachev's statement above all as a symbolic gesture of good will. On the other hand the Swedes are not ready to regard the news of the removal of missiles from the Kola Peninsula and the Leningrad area as a noteworthy arms cut.

Norway's foreign minister, Knud Frydenlund, said that Norway knew that the Soviet Union had removed the medium-range missiles from the Kola Peninsula a couple of years ago. Nevertheless according to Frydenlund it is a positive development if the Soviet Union intends to continue measures lessening tension in Northern Europe.

The Soviet Union dispatched Ligachev's Helsinki promises immediately to the Vienna CSCE conference and demanded there that the other party respond to them with the same kind of measures.

According to the Soviet delegates such measures could include guarantees by the Western nuclear powers for the nuclear-weapon-free zone to be formed in Northern Europe.

On Friday Tampere had the chance to become acquainted with the visiting "number two man" of the Soviet Union, Yegor Ligachev. The guest eagerly questioned his hosts about all kinds of matters and zealously wrote remarks in the small black-covered guest book.

Ligachev's visit to Finland as a guest of the Social Democratic Party ends today (Saturday). In their communique the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Social Democratic Party of Finland state their intention to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution and of Finland's independence jointly next year.

Photo caption: The people of Tampere receive the Soviet leader Yegor Ligachev warmly in the central square of the city. On the left Tampere's city manager, Jarmo Rantanen.

#### Framework of Power Politics

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 15 Nov 86 p 2

[Editorial: Overall Political Framework for Visit by the Kremlin's Number Two Man]

[Text] The first trip to the West by the number two man in the new leadership of the Soviet Union was prepared, as could be expected, to be an international political event that would have significance even far beyond both relations between the CPSU and the Finnish Social Democratic Party and between the Soviet Union and Finland.



In line with the new Gorbachev style Yegor Ligachev marched in front of the press in Helsinki far from empty handed. He had new concessions to present relating to the arms reduction negotiations. They were directed at the Nordic countries in particular, and their purpose was to provide new kindling for the discussions concerning Nordic security and the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Ligachev's announcement about the dismantling of the medium-range missile launching sites on the Kola Peninsula was not actually news, because medium-range missiles have not been there at all recently. The information about the Leningrad and Baltic Sea military districts, on the other hand, is something new, especially the removal of a few operational missile batteries from the region.

One should not overestimate the military significance of the missiles' removal. From the standpoint of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone the missile's intended target area is of greater significance than the place where the missiles themselves are located. Missiles can be aimed at the Nordic countries even from the Urals. The short-range tactical weapons installed in the areas adjacent to the Nordic countries have been more of an irritant to the Nordic countries than medium-range or strategic missiles.

In any event the question from a political standpoint is one of a substantial concession. The Soviet Union recognizes the reasonableness of the Nordic countries' demands that a "thinning zone" involving the territory of the Soviet Union too is absolutely essential for enlarging the nuclear-weapon-free zone. The concrete arms reductions announced by the Soviet Union can be interpreted as a unilateral opening, which would be followed by additional measures if the proposal really caught fire.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed its readiness to make the Baltic Sea a nuclear-weapon-free zone. What is new on such an authoritative level is the willingness to agree separately with "interested powers" or also the United States on the removal of nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles from the Baltic Fleet. What is involved would clearly be a limited step that could be implemented already before an agreement on making the Baltic Sea completely nuclear-weapon-free.

NATO's standpoint on the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone is fundamentally so negative that from this viewpoint the Soviet Union's proposals do not offer much new. In discussions among the Nordic countries, however, the zone is recognized as primarily a political process to be built up, which reduces the danger of the use of nuclear weapons in the region. From this standpoint the proposals are a worthy impetus to the continuation of discussion and diplomatic activity.

With regard to bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet Union Ligachev also had good news. He confirmed that the new leadership of his country had made a basic political decision to continue commercial and economic cooperation at the present high level despite balance of trade problems. Instruc-

tions in this regard have been given to the organizations managing foreign trade.

In practice it means that in the short term the Soviet Union will accommodate Finland by increasing its own exports in accordance with long-expressed Finnish wishes. Over a somewhat longer term the solution must be found in the diversification of our imports and in new forms of cooperation, concerning which Ligachev mentioned for the first time on such an authoritative level joint production facilities and enterprises.

With regard to political relations mention should be made of the point contained in Ligachev's speech that in President Koivisto's term of office he has "secured" the continuation and constancy of Kekkonen's line in managing relations between the countries.

The Kremlin's number two man arrived in Finland as the guest of the SDP. This is indisputably a foreign policy acknowledgment of the SDP as the party holding power at the moment. To a considerable extent the SDP holds its position thanks to the international role it has gained within the Socialist International. Over the years Kalevi Sorsa has risen into the group of central power figures of the International, the value of which is understood in Moscow.

#### Meets Center, Communist Parties

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 16 Nov 86 p 36

[Article: "Ligachev Finally Met the Leaders of the Center Party, Communist Party of Finland and the Taistoites: Aalto Got the Longest Time and Sinisalo Received an Invitation"]

[Text] The Communist Party delegation led by Chairman Arvo Aalto spent the most time in its meeting with the number two man of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yegor Ligachev, on Saturday at the embassy on Tehtaankatu.

For his part the chairman of the Taistoite Party or of the central committee of organizations of the Communist Party of Finland, Taisto Sinisalo, was able to announce after his meeting that a party delegation will travel to Moscow, perhaps in the first part of next year, as a guest of the CPSU.

Ligachev's conversations with the Communist Party of Finland lasted exactly an hour, and with the Taistoites 50 minutes. The chairman of the Center Party, Paavo Vayrynen, was with Ligachev for half an hour. The meeting with the Center party was first, with the Communist Party of Finland second and with the Taistoites third.

#### Tensions Now History

Aalto said that the meeting itself showed that "Relations between the Communist Party of Finland and the CPSU are relations of working cooperation."

"At a certain stage there were certain tensions, which have become history,"

Aalto said.

Aalto did not, however, have any precise information to present as to when delegations of the Communist Party of Finland and the CPSU would meet. In a recent HELSINGIN SANOMAT interview Aalto said that the parties had agreed on a party meeting in their joint work program. "There is an agreement on this with the CPSU. The matter has been confirmed now and it has been agreed to return to the matter," Aalto said on Saturday.

In the conversations Ligachev was said to have stated the same thing that he announced on Thursday, i. e. that the CPSU acknowledges the temporary splitting of the Communist Party of Finland and assumes a balanced attitude to both parties.

#### First Invitation to the Party

The minority communists considered the fact that Ligachev received them expressly as the representatives of a party and no longer as notable officials to be a triumph for them.

Only a short time ago, for example, Secretary General Jouko Kajanoja was not introduced as secretary general in a CPSU seminar. The invitation received by the Taistoites is the first official party invitation received from the CPSU by their party.

According to Sinisalo Ligachev's mention of the factual splitting of the Communist Party of Finland: "is a point of departure from which unification efforts can be directed forward." Sinisalo clarified that he was referring to a historical prospect.

Sinisalo indicated that the CPSU's balanced attitude to the two parties meant relating to them in accordance with the facts.

The balanced attitude was manifested Saturday among other things in the fact that Counselor of Embassy Vladimir Dmitriyev arranged group pictures with Ligachev for both communist delegations.

Other participants in the discussions included Ambassador Vladimir Sobolev, a deputy division chief from the Foreign Ministry, Yuriy Deryabin, as well as the deputy director of the International Department of the CPSU, Vitaliy Shapozhnikov and a worker from the Scandinavian Section, Vladimir Fedorov. The latter two did not participate in the discussions with Vayrynen and the party secretary of the Center Party, Seppo Kaariainen.

#### Center Party Visit Still Open

According to Vayrynen a Center Party delegation will travel to Moscow in the near future. The program and meetings included in it are in the preparatory stage. "There has been preliminary discussion about the beginning of December, but the date has not yet been firmed up," Vayrynen said.

Foreign Minister Vayrynen considers the measures announced by Ligachev, for example the removal of medium-range missiles from the regions adjacent to the Nordic countries, to be a significant, unilateral gesture. He hopes that the other side will respond in some way to the Soviet Union's step with their own measures.

As an extra item in his program Ligachev paid a quick visit to Finlandia House, after which the SDP chairman, Kalevi Sorsa, held a departure luncheon for the CPSU delegation at Kesaranta.

At the airport Ligachev praised the press volubly as he departed, which made the Social Democratic leaders smile a little worriedly. Sorsa felt that there were so many compliments that, "You may get stuck up again."

Photo captions: The communists arrange themselves equally into group pictures around Yegor Ligachev: On the left the secretary for international affairs of the Communist Party of Finland, Olavi Poikolainen, and the party chairman, Arvo Aalto. On the right the leading figures of the leftist communists, Jouko Kajanoja and Taisto Sinisalo. In the background Counselor of Embassy Vladimir Dmitriyev.

#### Norway, Sweden Cautious Towards Proposals

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 18 Nov 86 p 19

[Article: Norway and Sweden Are Still Considering Ligachev's Proposals]

[Text] Stockholm (Timo Vuorela) The prime ministers of Sweden and Norway do not yet want to take a position openly on the statement presented in Helsinki by Soviet Politburo member Yegor Ligachev concerning the reduction of missile weapon systems on the Kola Peninsula, around Leningrad and on the Baltic Sea.

The Social Democratic prime minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, who is visiting Stockholm at present, said on Monday that she wanted to be careful not to portray Ligachev's speeches as pure propaganda.

"We have to study Ligachev's speech objectively and analytically," Brundtland said. "There is no reason to call everything that comes from the Soviet Union concerning arms reduction propaganda."

The prime minister of Sweden, Ingvar Carlsson, (Social Democrat) also explained that he had had too little time to study Ligachev's proposals. Like Brundtland he considered the fact that the Soviet Union is interested in studying the concept of a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone to be a positive factor.

In a joint press briefing Carlsson recalled President Mauno Koivisto's proposal dealing with restraining the arms race in the Nordic sea areas. Carlsson said that in the situation that has arisen after the Reykjavik summit meeting and the Stockholm CSCE conference it is important to keep the process moving forward.

The prime ministers said that the conversations on Monday dealt with the joint policy of the Nordic countries with regard to South Africa, relations between East and West, international security questions, trade cooperation, the work of the environmental commission headed by Brundtland and bilateral subjects.

The South African question has been especially in the public eye because of the fact that Sweden and Norway have followed different lines regarding the initiation of an economic boycott against the racially oppressive government.

Photo caption: Norway's prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, converses with her Swedish counterpart Ingvar Carlsson in the Rosenbad government facility in Stockholm.

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POLL FAVORS CENTER, SDP, SORSA; POP, DEVA, SKDL IN GOP

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 Dec 86 p 29

[Article by Arto Astikainen: "HS Poll: Sorsa Best Suited for Prime Minister. Paavo Vayrynen Not Number One Even among Center Party Supporters. Center Party and SDP Wanted in Cabinet, POP, DEVA and SKDL in Opposition"]

[Text] Finns hope and believe that also in the next cabinet the Prime Minister will be Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of SDP [Finnish Social Democratic Party]. In the HS [HELSINGIN SANOMAT] Poll of November, one half of the respondents named Sorsa as the best suited to be prime minister in the next cabinet. The second prime ministerial candidate in popularity was Paavo Vayrynen, chairman of the Center Party but he lagged far behind Sorsa. Even most of the supporters of the Center Party named Sorsa as the best suited to be prime minister.

The people do not seem to look forward to any major upheavals in the remaining coalition of the cabinet, either. Two thirds of the Finns eligible to vote consider that the Center Party and SDP, the current main parties in the cabinet, should be included in the new cabinet as well. The third most desired party in the cabinet was the Conservative Party, which has sat in opposition for 20 years.

The respondents considered that the opposition would be best suited for the Constitutionalists, SKDL and DEVA [Democratic Alternative], the electoral party of the stalinist communists.

The HS Poll inquired who would be the best suited person to be the next prime minister with an open question: no candidate was offered to the respondents. Several dozen candidates emerged from the sample of 1507 people, even though 27 percent could not name anyone as the best suited.

Of those named, Sorsa was the overwhelming number one. Most of those advocating Sorsa were supporters of his own party, SDP, but he turned out to be the most desirable even among the supporters of all other parties.

The result also reflects the fact that people expect Sorsa, who has lead four cabinets, to continue as prime minister also after the elections. Already, Sorsa has the record as the Finnish prime minister with the longest term.

The support for Ilkka Suominen, chairman of the Conservative Party and Harri Holkeri, the Party's presidential candidate, as well as for Christoffer Taxell, chairman of SPP [Swedish People's Party] was so low that the supporters of those parties obviously do not consider their leaders as realistic prime ministerial candidates.

The support for Holkeri and Suominen was the same among all respondents. Within the Conservative Party, Holkeri passed Suominen by a narrow margin.

Among the supporters of the Center Party, Vayrynen competed quite well with Sorsa but, nevertheless, his popularity did not reach the level of Sorsa's. The Center Party has requested that the next cabinet has to be "center-led," the prime minister's chair has to be given to the Center Party. That request did not receive particularly wide support in the Poll.

One percent of the respondents considered SPP's Taxell the best suited to be prime minister. Taxell's support was strongest among the supporters of SPP (15 percent), although 45 percent of SPP's supporters named Sorsa as the best suited.

There have already been plans to make Taxell into a compromise prime minister in case the major parties cannot agree on who is to lead the cabinet.

Beside Taxell, those who received one percent of the support were Kalevi Kivisto (people's democrat), Erkki Pystynen (conservative) and Pekka Vennamo (rural party).

Surprisingly, Vennamo received significant support from the supporters of SKDL.

#### Conservatives Pushed into the Cabinet Coalition

In the HS Poll, enquiries about which parties should be included in the new cabinet were made in two ways: which parties should be included in the new cabinet and which parties should not be included.

The present cabinet coalition (SDP, Center Party, SPP and Finnish Rural Party) is still popular. More than two thirds of the respondents want to include the Center Party and SDP in the cabinet, one third want SPP and FRP [Finnish Rural Party]. Only the

Conservative Party managed to push into the proposed cabinet coalition; the proposal was supported by over a half of the respondents.

More than one fifth of the respondents thought that SKDL should go into the cabinet and almost the same number thought that SKDL should not be included. The attitude towards the Christian Party was similar.

It was obviously more difficult for the people to determine which parties should not to be included in the cabinet than which should be included. The respondents were provided with a card in which all the parties were listed.

The people considered POP, DEVA and SKDL as the parties least suitable to be included in the cabinet.

Among the parties currently in the cabinet, FRP had the most opposition. The one least opposed was the Center Party.

The strongest desires to enter the cabinet are among the supporters of the Center Party and the Conservative Party. Ninety-three percent of the supporters of each party were of the opinion that their own party should be included in the cabinet. The corresponding percentage in SDP was 90. Seventy-two percent of the supporters of SKDL wanted to have their party included in the cabinet.

Among the supporters of SDP, 69 percent wanted the Center Party in the cabinet and 42 percent wanted the Conservative Party. The supporters of the Conservative Party wished to have the Center Party (76 percent) and SDP (65 percent) as partners of their party in the cabinet. The supporters of the Center Party, on the other hand, preferred SDP to the Conservative party. The figures were 73 and 60 percent.

A clear basis for the cabinet was obvious among the supporters of SKDL: a people's front consisting of SKDL, SDP and the Center Party. Only 11 percent of the supporters of SKDL considered that the Conservatives should be included in the cabinet.

The other parties wishing to see FRP in the cabinet were, above all, the supporters of the Center Party; the supporters of SPP wanted to see the Greens, and the Greens wanted the stalinists into the cabinet, more than did the supporters of DEVA itself.



## Young People Prefer Greens and Conservatives but Are Very Uncertain Voters

Since the last elections, the greens and the conservatives have increased their support more than others but, in the March parliamentary elections, both are facing the same problem: a significant share of their supporters are young, and young people are the most uncertain voters.

The HS Poll indicated that the popularity of the Greens has doubled among young people compared with that among the older population. The party most favored by the youngest voters was clearly the Conservative Party. However, at the same time, voters under 25 years of age are the most uncertain about their own behavior in the next parliamentary elections.

Only 39 percent of the voters under 25 years were certain that they would vote. The figure is lower than in any other poll after January 1983.

The question concerning the certainty of voting was exactly the same as the one posed in HS Polls before the previous parliamentary elections in January and March 1983. The result and the comparison indicate that the share of those who are "certain to vote" is about the same as before the elections of the spring 1983, i.e. over 60 percent.

The certainty of voting seems to increase slightly when the elections are approaching. In the polls of January 1983, the share of "certain" voters was 64 percent, in the March polls it was 69 percent, the final voting percentage in the elections being 75. The election campaign is not yet in full swing so that the most suitable point of comparison is the HS Poll of January 1983.

The share of certain voters now seems to be lower among the supporters of the Center Party, the Conservative Party and SDP than in January 1983. The people of SPP are just as eager as in 1983, and the supporters of SKDL would now seem to be more certain of their voting than in 1983.

The supporters of the Greens as a whole are the most uncertain voters. Only 41 percent of the supporters of the Greens indicated that they were certain to vote in the elections next spring.

## FRP Support Changed a Lot

The estimate of the HS Poll concerning the support for the parties indicates that no major changes have taken place in the major parties since the last parliamentary and local elections.

The support for FRP is the one which has changed the most. In November it was 4.8 percentage units smaller than in the parliamentary elections of 1983. However, since the local elections of 1984 FRP's support has only fallen 0.4 percentage units.

The support for FRP seems to fluctuate also in different polls. For example, Taloustutkimus [Economic Research] measured a support of nearly eight percent to FRP in October.

The support for the Greens has risen the most since the parliamentary and local elections, 3.5 and 2.2 percentage units. In the polls conducted in the autumn, the support measured for the Greens has been about five percent.

SKDL's support has fallen over three percentage units since both the parliamentary and local elections. The decrease is partly to be explained by the fact that the minority faction established their own electoral party, Democratic Alternative, and its support is now measured independently.

The support for the social democrats has remained about the same, decreased by 0.8 percentage units since the parliamentary elections but risen by 1.2 percentage units since the local elections.

The conservatives have increased their support since both elections and the party is now getting closer to the largest party, SDP.

In November, the Center Party's support was clearly higher than in the last parliamentary elections but the locally strong party did not do as well as in the local elections even though the votes for the liberals are deducted from the share of 20.2 percent in the local elections.

In the fall the Center Party was already getting worried when Economic Research measured less than 16 percent support for it in its poll in October.

The support for the Swedes and for all minor parties has remained somewhat stable.

#### Traditional Red Soil Strengthened

Since the last parliamentary elections, the joint support for the current parties in the cabinet, SDP, Center Party, SPP and FRP, has decreased by four percentage units, mainly due to the collapse of FRP. However, it is still well over 50 percent.

On the other hand, the traditional red soil basis, the coalition of social-democrats and Center party, SPP and liberals, has strengthened its support.

In the parliamentary elections of 1983, the red soil parties jointly received the total of 48.9 percent of the votes. Now their support is 50.6 percent. In 1983 the red soil basis received over 100 seats in the Parliament, even though it did not receive 50 percent of the votes.

A year ago, Center Party chairman Paavo Vayrynen designed an expanded center coalition for the next cabinet negotiations which would include also the Christians. The new center coalition (Center Party, SPP, Liberal Party and SKL [Finnish Christian League]) captured 27.7 percent support in the HS Poll, i.e. more than SDP. It is also Vayrynen's aim in the next elections.

The autumn's political "honeymooners," SDP and the Conservative Party, now received 49.7 percent of the support jointly. If the election result would reflect that, the SDP and the Conservative Party would be quite likely to assemble a majority in the Parliament, i.e. over 100 seats.

Twenty percent of the respondents in the HS Poll did not indicate their party affiliation.

When analyzing the support estimates, it must also be remembered that, above all, the results are indications of party affiliations. In the elections the voter is in a situation of choice, in which he takes a stand, not only on the party but also on the candidate; and then the party affiliation may give way.

Table 1. WHO WILL BE NEXT PRIME MINISTER

| <u>Candidate</u> | <u>All</u> | <u>SDP</u> | <u>Conserv.</u> | <u>Center Party</u> | <u>SKDL</u> |
|------------------|------------|------------|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|
|                  | <u>%</u>   | <u>%</u>   | <u>%</u>        | <u>%</u>            | <u>%</u>    |
| Kalevi Sorsa     | 49         | 77         | 37              | 38                  | 58          |
| Paavo Vayrynen   | 9          | 4          | 8               | 31                  | 3           |
| Harri Holkeri    | 3          | -          | 8               | 2                   | 1           |
| Ilkka Suominen   | 3          | 1          | 7               | 2                   | -           |
| Others together  | 9          | 2          | 12              | 6                   | 15          |
| Cannot say       | 27         | 16         | 28              | 21                  | 23          |

Question: "In your opinion, who would be best suited to be prime minister in the next cabinet?"

Table 2. WHICH PARTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN CABINET

| <u>Parties</u> | <u>Should be included<br/>in cabinet %</u> | <u>Should not be included<br/>in cabinet %</u> |
|----------------|--|--|
| Center Party   | 68   | 3  |
| SDP            | 68   | 5  |
| Conserv.       | 53   | 9  |
| SPP            | 30   | 8  |
| FRP            | 33   | 18   |
| SKDL           | 23   | 21   |
| SKL            | 13   | 15   |
| LKP            | 13   | 8  |
| Greens         | 12   | 14   |
| SEP            | 6  | 14   |
| POP            | 5  | 25   |
| DEVA           | 3  | 21   |
| Cannot say     | 13   | 41   |

The questions: "When a new cabinet is formed in our country after the parliamentary elections next spring, which parties, in your opinion, should be included in it?" "And which parties should not be included?"

Legend:

|              |                                    |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| Center Party | Finnish Center Party               |
| SDP          | Finnish Social-Democratic Party    |
| Conserv.     | Finnish Conservative Party         |
| SPP          | Swedish People's Prty              |
| FRP          | Finnish Rural Party                |
| SKDL         | Finnish People's Democratic League |
| SKL          | Finnish Christian League           |
| LKP          | Liberal Party                      |
| Greens       | Greens                             |
| SEP          | Finnish Progressive Party          |
| POP          | Constitutional Rightwing Party     |
| DEVA         | Democratic Alternative             |

Table 3: VOTING ACTIVITY

| <u>Likelihood</u>   | <u>HS poll</u><br><u>January</u><br><u>1983</u><br><u>%</u> | <u>HS poll</u><br><u>March</u><br><u>1983</u><br><u>%</u> | <u>HS poll</u><br><u>November</u><br><u>1986</u><br><u>%</u> |
|---------------------|---|---|--|
| Certain to vote     | 64  | 69  | 62   |
| Likely to vote      | 20  | 18  | 22   |
| Not likely to vote  | 4   | 3   | 5  |
| Certain not to vote | 3   | 4   | 3  |
| Cannot say          | 9   | 6   | 8  |

Question: "If the parliamentary elections were to be held in our country now, how certain are you about going to vote?"

Table 4. CERTAIN VOTERS IN DIFFERENT POPULATION SEGMENTS

|                                     | <u>Will certainly vote<br/>in elections %</u> |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| ALL                                 | 62  |
| AGE GROUP:                          |   |
| - under 25                          | 39  |
| - 25-34 years                       | 58  |
| - 35-49 years                       | 68  |
| - 50-64 years                       | 75  |
| - over 64 years                     | 67  |
| EDUCATION:                          |   |
| - folk school                       | 65  |
| - middle or comprehensive<br>school | 50  |
| - high school or academic<br>degree | 70  |
| SOCIAL STATUS:                      |   |
| - farmers                           | 59  |
| - workers                           | 54  |
| - salaried employees                | 69  |

Table 5. PARTY SUPPORT IN PERCENT

| <u>Parties</u>          | <u>Parliamentary<br/>elections 1983</u> | <u>HS Poll<br/>Nov 1986</u> | <u>Change</u> |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---------------|
| SDP                     | 26.7                                    | 25.9                        | -0.8          |
| SKDL                    | 14.0                                    | 10.3                        | -3.7          |
| DEVA                    | -                                       | 1.2                         |               |
| Socialists<br>total     | 40.7                                    | 37.4                        | -3.3          |
| Conserv.                | 22.1                                    | 23.8                        | +1.7          |
| Center Party            | 16.6                                    | 18.5                        | +1.9          |
| SPP                     | 4.6                                     | 5.0                         | +0.4          |
| FRP                     | 9.7                                     | 4.9                         | -4.8          |
| SKL                     | 3.0                                     | 3.0                         | +/-0          |
| LKP                     | 1.0                                     | 1.2                         | +0.2          |
| SEP                     | -                                       | 0.6                         |               |
| POP                     | 0.4                                     | 0.6                         | +0.2          |
| KVL                     | 0.1                                     | -                           |               |
| Non-socialists<br>total | 57.5                                    | 57.6                        | +0.1          |
| Greens                  | 1.5                                     | 5.0                         | +3.5          |
| Others<br>(Ahvenanmaa)  | 0.3                                     | -                           |               |

In the results of the 1983 elections, the votes of the communist electoral college in Lapland have been added to the share of SKDL. Center Party and Liberal Party entered together as one party in the elections but in the table their support has been separated.



### This Is How the Poll Was Conducted

On 13-30 November, Suomen Gallup Oy conducted a poll, at the request of HELSINGIN SANOMAT, in which a total of 1507 people were interviewed about their attitude to issues of current interest.

The interviews were conducted in 103 communities. The group of respondents represents the population eligible to vote, outside Ahvenanmaa, and it was formed with a shared random sampling.

The estimate of the support for the parties in November 1986 has been devised by combining the answers received in the interviews and the election statistics of the local elections of 1984.

The questions regarding party affiliation were presented in the following form:

"The previous local elections were held in October 1984. Which party did you vote for in that election?"

"If parliamentary elections were to be held in our country now, to which party's candidate would you give your vote?"

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CSO: 3617/34

## LCR COMMENTARY ON MARCHAIS SPEECH, PCF INTERNAL CONFLICT

Paris ROUGE in French 27 Nov-3 Dec 86 p 10

[Article by J.L.]

[Text] Suddenly, on the program RTL-LE MONDE Grand Jury on 23 November, it appeared that Georges Marchais would provide some revelations. "I will tell you about the health of the party... There is an agreement which never ceases to grow with the policy we considered at the 25th Congress..." A statement like this might surprise the attentive reader of L'HUMANITE who has observed the caution with which Madeleine Vincent, speaking on behalf of the Political Bureau, reported at the last Central Committee meeting on the manner of dealing with elected communist officials.

"Elected communist officials have their mandate from the people, and not from the party," she explained, taking the number (majority?) of elected officials who signed the appeal for a special 26th Congress into explicit account. To leave no room for the slightest ambiguity, she added that the relationship between the PCF and its elected officials is not a matter of "subordination to or dependence upon the party," and that the Central Committee session did not exert "meddling control." She recognized, regarding these officials, that "Their diversity is our wealth." The only limit mentioned by the communist leader was that the elected officials "should not do battle for a policy other" than that of the PCF.

In the same way, the secretary general seemed to disregard the failure of his party to play any role in the demonstration organized to protest the deportation of 101 citizens of Mali. This was a departure so controversial and so much felt within the party that Patrick Tort had drafted a petition which was signed by a large number of communists, appealing for resistance against a "legal system" which allows such a penalty. Georges Labica and Pierre Juquin secured the endorsement of Lucien Seve, Henri Lefebvre, Michel Vovelle, Michel Cardoze, Alain Krivine, Gilbert Wasserman, Francesca Solleville, Alain Amicabile, etc., among others. Thus antiracist inclinations were forgotten in the report of good health delivered by Georges Marchais.

Health bulletin by health bulletin, the haste with which the leadership responded to the article by Pierre Juquin in LE MONDE was also an indication of the existence of the "strong majority" of which Andre Lajoinie spoke last

June. In his article, Pierre Juquin urged more than one national conference to choose the communist candidate for the presidential election, as well as to define the attitude of the party on the second round. Georges Marchais responded to the CC before Andre Lajoinie had an opportunity to do so on the airwaves. Public discussion with the members of its majority and its minority--such, then, is the current situation in the PCF. And the questions under discussion are of interest to the entire workers' movement, "beyond our differences," as Juquin wrote in LE MONDE.

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CS0:3519/33

## TJIBAOU ON NEW CALEDONIAN REFERENDUM, FLNKS PLANS

Paris ROUGE in French 27 Nov-3 Dec 86 p 15

[Interview with FLNKS President Jean-Marie Tjibaou by Alain Krivine in France; date not given]

[Text] Jean-Marie Tjibaou has just paid a visit to France. Chirac, noting his mistrust of the Kanaks, refused to see him. The president of the FLNKS was willing to answer our questions.

[Question] What would your first assessment of your meetings with the new majority be?

[Answer] The first thing one might note is the power of the New Caledonian lobby and its grip on Oudinot Street. This local government has financial resources and two deputies, and thus the means of obtaining respect for its demands. Particularly since Chirac's majority has dwindled, and he needs the votes of these deputies. This New Caledonian lobby is also profiting from the approach of the next presidential election. Before 1988, Chirac must strengthen his position with his electorate. Thus it is for him alone and his general staff in Paris to choose whether he will join with the lobby or whether he is willing to disappoint it in order to achieve a more striking national image for the future. The alternative opposes the classic image of the past, the colonial era, which every good New Caledonian citizen has, and that of a France linked with the progressive, democratic traditions of 1789.

I must say that the preceding government did not make this choice, either. The Cancun discourse was marvelous, but the action of the government in New Caledonia was pitiable.

[Question] Today, both practice and discussion are moving in the same direction, toward colonial repression.

[Answer] Yes, and this is terrible. We reported this, moreover, to Francois Mitterrand. With us, repression is even harsher than that of Pasqua was here. The injustice is directed against the blacks.

[Question] Is the government ready to yield on the electoral system for the referendum?

[Answer] On the ideological level, I do not think so. But Chirac is a pragmatist, and he will perhaps be more pragmatic than the socialists have been.

[Question] If the organization of the referendum does not allow the Kanak people self-determination, will the FLNKS defend a boycott position, as it has already said it would?

[Answer] We will not participate in self-determination which is just a masquerade. Thus it is necessary first to define what self-determination is. Then it will be possible to defuse the impassioned debate concerning the electoral body. It will be possible to discuss what will follow the referendum and the guarantees provided for individuals and property within the framework of independence. And we will defend our policy. The Kanak people will offer propositions designed in particular to allow other people to live and work permanently in New Caledonia insofar as they may choose to live in this country.

I do not think that the government has made a decision at this time, whatever Pons may say. At the beginning of December, he will announce a date for the referendum. And at the same time, he says that independence is not an issue. For my part, I do not know what kind of birds these are.

[Question] What is the status of the mobilization of the Kanak people? What are the ways in which the coming French presidential election might be affected?

[Answer] Let us look to the holding of this referendum. I think that this will heat things up, you will see.

[Question] How do you view the aftermath of the events in Thio?

[Answer] I believe that the press may bear criminal responsibility when it presents people as provocateurs when in fact they were victims. Look--the Mouldous are sympathizers with our cause. The "fachos" burn their bakeries and their vehicles and shoot at them. And then it is they who are arrested and imprisoned. It is absolutely unbelievable. And all this time, the "fachos" continue to parade with their rifles in the midst of the mobile guards, of whom there are 450 in Thio, although it is only a small village. I believe that these people want to wipe out the insult Eloi Machoro dealt them. And I think that it is a question, above all, of a provocation organized during my trip to France in the hope of preventing any negotiation. The goal has been partially achieved, since Chirac has refused to see me. The collusion with Mr Lafleur, who has admitted asking Chirac not to see me, is obvious.

These people want to provoke us in the civil war sector, because they believe that they are equipped and that they can win. But we are not concerned with this. We are fighting for independence, so that as many people as possible can work with enthusiasm to build a new country.

[Question] Have you a final statement for the readers of ROUGE?

[Answer] The militants must remain vigilant. The battle is no different from that which is being waged in France against racism, the reform of the nationality code, unemployment and the security policies.

I believe that New Caledonia is a testing ground. It is very important that there be witnesses here. Above all if the government uses lies in an effort to destroy us. If we do not participate in a referendum, it will have to find a legitimate process for attacking us. Thus there must be vigilance here so that we can draw attention to this and can resist.

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CSO:3519/33

## JUQUIN, HINCKER SPEAK AT NEW MARXIST PUBLICATION FORUM

Paris ROUGE in French 27 Nov-3 Dec 86 p 10

[Article by Jean Lantier]

[Text] On 20 November, the periodical M organized a debate on today's Marxism. It was a real success and an unparalleled opportunity for the comparison of different points of view. (M stands for monthly, Marxism and movement, and its headquarters are at 209 rue Saint-Maur, Paris, 75011.)

Those who are absent are always wrong. It is equally true that the hall reserved for the Paris M club could hardly have held more than the 400 individuals present. The debate on Marxism was organized by Gilbert Wasserman and Henri Lefebvre, and the invited guests were to make it lively for the audience. Yvon Quinioux, Francois Hincker, Georges Labica, Patrick Tort, Jacques Bidet and Ernest Mandel were the participants in this first undertaking of its sort in the capital city.

After a short introduction by Henri Lefebvre, who defined dialectics and Marxist thought, Yvon Quinioux set forth some initial questions concerning the predictions of Marx about the advanced capitalist countries and the problems in the transition to socialism. He defended the social democracy which truly exists in Sweden, as opposed to that which, in the Eastern countries, does not really merit the name socialism.

After Francois Hincker had sworn that he would never again be associated with the likes of the May 1968 events, and after Patrick Tort had urged his new concept of the "people," saying in passing that "The armchair image of the leftist intellectual is a thing of the past," Ernest Mandel set forth his interpretation of Marxism.

#### Understanding With a View to Action

Marxism, he said, makes it possible to understand the crisis, which is reflected in the 40 million people unemployed in Europe, where social democracy has failed in its capitalist management. He analyzed and condemned a method of production which is incapable of controlling the overall effects of competition and the development of the productive forces. But in Mandel's view, Marxism is also a science and a tool for emancipation. He urges an

understanding of the intervention in the three sectors of the revolution--the Third World, advanced capitalist countries and those of "real socialism."

Georges Labica, in turn, with the precision which listeners familiar with him find in all his statements, defended a Marxism which makes it possible to define the tasks in the class struggle. He said he agreed with Mandel in conceiving of it as a tool for understanding the world with a view to changing it. The urgent need for this change for France is evident every day. When the liberals reject any program, any contemplation, and even reject knowledge, then Marxism must take action. In France, 8 million poor people deny the right of anyone at all to speak of capitalist opulence.

In the opinion of Labica, Marxism has therefore long since killed off those whose intention was to see it dead, and the 5 years of leftist government have revealed the impasse in the management of capitalism. This is why, he concludes, it is necessary to regroup the anticapitalist movement, both for contemplation, such as that the M club meeting made possible, as well as for action and for the definition of a plan for a communist society.

Daniel Bensaid, for his part, urged a Marxism which makes it possible to understand reality, to redefine the workers' class as the main protagonist in change and in breaking with the system, to take the trauma of the "breakup" into account--in this case the frustrated hopes of the liberation struggles in Southeast Asia--and to assess the capacity of the present setback for the Polish workers' class to weaken the bureaucratic yoke. The current task, he said, involves knowing how a generation with this experience can establish a link with a younger generation familiar with a certain form of politicization, while also retaining the revolutionary communist tradition and culture.

#### Staying Alive

Pierre Juquin concluded the evening with the following statement: "We have without a doubt taken a first step. There are major forces available for drafting a revolutionary line and putting it in practice, a revolutionary movement which can rally and advance." Emphasizing this point, he said that "It is impossible for the revolutionary movement to perpetuate itself without revolutionary organization... It is possible that the revolutionary movement may scatter, divide and weaken for some years." And he added: "It is not within the power of any leader of apparatus to prevent this development... I regard this evening's gathering as a very demanding and very harsh reminder of this responsibility... It is probable that we have avoided the catastrophe of the disappearance of the revolutionary movement..." His conclusion was categorical. "The past, in terms of different strata and different states of awareness, were represented this evening by individuals coming from different origins and organizations... We waged a battle among ourselves... And yet we cannot free ourselves of this responsibility--that of developing a project, theoretically and practically, so that it can wrest victory from our defeats."

It was definitely a successful evening.

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CSO:3519/33



## PROSPECTS PRESENTLY OPEN FOR PAPANDREOU LISTED

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 10 Nov 86 p 6

[Article by Khr. Pasalaris]

[Excerpt] If we want to draw some pleasing, or even displeasing, conclusion from developments in the last four weeks in order to see what is in store for us in the immediate future, and with what our history of 165 years [of freedom] will be adorned, then let us not hesitate, any of us here or there, to acknowledge that:

First: PASOK is steadily losing, from day to day, its good testimonial from inside and outside. Since the October elections, no one, not even the leader himself, believes any longer that he is unshakeable and immovable. The myth about the unbeatable and super-lucky PASOK which would stay in power "for many more four-year terms" has dissolved. Conversely, the eyes of those "outside" and at home are turned again to the liberal democratic faction with its changed character, new officials and new ideas, with the only question being how sufficient are the guarantees it disposes for a good and honorable managing of power.

Second: Andreas Papandreou is in his pajamas on the balcony of a party "shopping complex" which has caught fire. He has no other choice but jumping to save himself. What concerns him is how he will land "softly" and into which of the two "rescue nets" he will jump. That which Florakis, with the "other progressive forces of Allagi," is stretching out for him below, or the other which is Sartzetakis, stretched out and not intending to get up before 9 March 1990? Or maybe he will jump into space and come what may?

Third: Although the "Right" emerged much strengthened from the elections, although the youth refuse now to pass through the "schools of the Left" as before, Andreas has "stuck" to what Karamanlis said years ago: That while the communists are only 12 percent, nevertheless 60 percent of the Greeks insist upon playing the part of leftists. Andreas figured out with his little computer that in October he lost more from his left side and less from his right. And whereas after June 1985 he drank water stolen from rightist tanks, now he is bending again to the left with the sorrowful made-up face of the repentant clown. He threw out Giannopoulos and on 28 October received Florakis shortly before he left for Moscow. He listened carefully to his four terms, began to satisfy them with tax reliefs, price freezes, stabilizations in GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor] and an opening of television; he posted Pangalos to protect Syria from Thatcher's claws and he is already anxiously awaiting in Athens Gorbachev,

that skillful public-relations personality of the international firmament who vitally needs two or three like Andreas to torment the western world from above and from within, in the private game of bloodless equilibriums....

Fourth: If Gorbachev has persuaded Florakis to make a front with Andreas, even if it is with a small change in the electoral system in force, and with candidates mutually trustworthy to PASOK's coalitions, so that the simple proportional will be implemented in practice, then Andreas has no other choice than going for elections next spring, after bombarding the land with a gallant reshuffle, refinements of "style and character" in the party, and some economic measures for the people--when he will have pocketed the rest of the EEC loan. The "dividing line" will then be between the "Left's front" and the "liberal democratic faction's front." The difference is that, if the "Left's front" wins without PASOK being independent, then Andreas will automatically be a prisoner of Florakis and the country will be--though not necessarily Soviet--much further from the West than ever before, for a number of years at least.

Fifth: In the time remaining until Andreas' jump from the balcony, this side has to engage itself in a huge effort, the purpose of which is to save the country and the democratic institutions. It will be a tough race, with Mitsotakis obligated to show the people exactly how he intends to govern and what serious solutions he has to offer to the people's problems. This time, neither 42 percent nor 48 percent is enough to bring this side to power without having problems of defections and abandonments. The pan-democratic front under the leadership of Mitsotakis (with one Stefanopoulos, who from now on ought to acknowledge the fruitlessness of his effort and release his 11 deputies so, in a first phase, they will become independent and, in a second, will cooperate with New Democracy) would be able to govern comfortably only if it exceeds 53 to 55 percent, and no longer with a banner of polarization and "dividing lines" between rightists and leftists, between rich and poor, greens and blues, but with a national general mobilization for a new journey toward prosperity which this country is entitled to obtain after so many unsuccessful episodes....

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CSO: 3521/31

## MAURIZIO MURELLI HEADS NEW NEO-FASCIST GROUP

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 26 Oct 86 pp 28-29

[Article by Gad Lerner: "Red Faces"]

[Text] A new generation of Mussolini's heirs looks with a friendly eye on Qadhdhafi, and even on Stalin. Its leader is Maurizio Murelli, who served 10 years in prison for murder. Among their prime targets for polemical pyrotechnics is MSI leader Giorgio Pisano.

Which group is more fascist than the other? Is it Salo veteran Giorgio Pisano, grand admiral of underground maneuvering in the name of anti-communism? Or could it be bomb-thrower Maurizio Murelli, who, 13 years ago, confessed to the murder of police officer Antonio Marino, but today is the standard-bearer for the alliance with Qadhdhafism and Stalinism, sworn to stamp out the Jewish and American contagion?

The worst, if you watch it, always seems to be getting worse. Meanwhile the political thermostat is rising, and its level envelops the new direction of the MSI's entire young generation.

This Murelli is a muscular young Milanese tough who, during a demonstration on Via Bellotto on 12 April 1983, in the company of his sidekick Vittorio Loi, lobbed a hand grenade at officer Marino, killing him instantly. Having served 11 of the 20 years in prison to which he was sentenced upon conviction, he now lives modestly at Saluzzo, in the Piedmont. From there, he sends his message out to Milan, and it is beamed from there all over Italy via his ORION magazine, but laser-tuned to reach "all those political soldiers who have never forgotten the ideal army fielded in the 20th century, numbering among its leaders "Caesar, Barbarossa, Mussolini, and Hitler," and among its great thinkers "Nietzsche, Evole, Mishima, and La Rochelle."

Is this merely another of the proliferating right-wing micro-organizations that swarm on the swampy fringes of the MSI? Actually, that does not appear to be the case.

What is true, though, is that an MSI periodical known as CANDIDO and sponsored by Senator Pisano, has chosen it as its target for and symbol of the "crisis among right-wing youth." The more so in that Murelli's publishing house also prints the official organ of the MSI youth movement, known as FARE FRONTE. And ORION's propaganda is drilled into the heads of Almirante's teenagers.

Pisano himself, when questioned, talks of "intolerable pro-Arafat, pro-Qadhdhafi, pro-Soviet, and pro-communist deviation, capable of brainwashing alarming numbers of youthful rightists who are now, culturally speaking, at risk of winding up with "flattened brain-waves." Just what is so new and different about ORION's readership, which devours 2,000 copies of every issue, and is about to undergo metamorphosis, to emerge in the imago state as a full-fledged political organization? As it turns out, anti-semitism (a typical quote: "The lethal, endemic disease that has infected the Indo-european peoples is Judaism") is combined with the search for novelty in the form of new and unexpected alliances (including some on the left and among the Greens), and with incongruous cultural couplings. In fact, Murelli and his disciples are preaching a holy alliance among all stripes of extremists, and with all brands of totalitarianism, and they seek to validate that by dredging up masses of quotations from Mussolini, out of which, with an extra touch of ingenuity, it is possible to deduce some sense of fellow-feeling on the Duce's part for the Soviet system, for Stalin's rule, and for fascism's roots in socialism.

"Was it not revolutionary for Mussolini to hail the Russian Revolution?" cries Murelli, and goes on to excoriate Gorbachov's new "liberal attitude" as "craven yielding," a corruption of the USSR under Stalin and Brezhnev, solicited by the nefarious influence of American "global power" and by Zionism, of which the Trilateral commission is the highest expression. Such ravings are flanked by an avalanche of quotations—taken out of context—from the most disparate authors.

What is more, they evoke a genuine response in the "movement-oriented" enthusiasm that sets the youth Front itself apart, now that the days of the bully-boys have drawn to an end. On more than one occasion, in fact, young MSI people have been exploring new ground for concerted action with other movements: just last week they decided to join in an anti-nuclear demonstration sponsored by the Greens (FGCI) and the Proletarian Democratic Party (DP), despite the fact that the MSI summit remains rigidly pro-nuclear; last year they joined in the campaign for repeal of the emergency laws enacted during the 70s, and just the other day two activists from the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), Gilberto Cavallini and Andrea Calvi, agreed for the first time to talk of their experiences as broadcasters at so far-Left a station as Radio Popolare.

"You're right: we do see remarkable progress in severing ties between the Youth Front and the MSI's gerontological summit," says Murelli, who takes a dim view of the CANDIDO campaign: "Pisano? He's nothing but a tool of the CIA." From the other side, the response is not calculated to turn away wrath, and in fact both papers are beginning to show symptoms of an imminent and protracted campaign of reciprocal blackmail threats. To ORION, which threatens to reveal Pisano's behavior on 12 April 1973, the day of the clash in Via Bellotti, the senator replies: "If Murelli really insists, I shall decide to reveal just what happened on the afternoon of Saturday 14 April 1973. And then we shall see just who it was that truly behaved like a fascist."

Please, Senator, tell us all about it!

"You see, Murelli has contrived a martyr's halo for himself among the extreme right, arguing that he was the victim of malicious tale-bearing perpetrated by our Deputy Franco Servello, because it was Servello who named him and Loi at an official press conference on that 14 April. The truth, though, is something else again. That afternoon at 1600 hours I received a telephone call at my home from a carabinieri stationed on Viale Berengario, a comrade whose name I shall never reveal. We agreed to meet across from the Fairgrounds, and he introduced himself as a sympathizer with the Movement and a member of Ordine Nuovo. He told me that Loi and Murelli, both Party members at the time, had confessed. At 1830 hours a press conference was called which would be told of the grounds for invoking the Scelba Act against the MSI. I ran to Senator Nencioni's office, where I found Servello as well. I intended to head off that maneuver by summoning the press ourselves, providing it with names and then distancing ourselves from the whole matter.

That is how it worked out; thanks to the breach of discipline on the part of that valiant Party member, the MSI was saved. To this day, poor old Servello doesn't even know the name of the man who told us. All right, Murelli: Who behaved like a true fascist? Was it I, who moved fast to save the Party, or was it you, who so senselessly threatened my life?

[Boxed material, p 29]

The first was Giorgio Albertazzi: "I believe that my experience in the Italian Social Republic was a glorious adventure, stimulating, truly unique. I am certain that, given the same conditions—historical, environmental, and emotional—I would not switch flags."

It would appear, though, that many others lag behind him in the process of reassessing, or at least of no longer concealing, that fascist and Salò past that, until quite recently, was tantamount to a shameful brand. In the editorial offices of CANDIDO, the MSI

organ that is now eagerly seeking and soliciting such nostalgic memoirs, they are overjoyed, "Not only are we no longer ashamed: we are eager to talk about it."

Here again, Ugo Tognazzi speaks: "While certain left-wing intellectuals were singing in the same chorus, I descried very clearly their desire for a government that would gradually requite them for their wretched condition of servitude. However, when, during the RSI [Salò] years, I worked at Radio Fante, I was never—and I would emphasize that 'never'—handed a release flimsy that would distort or slant my satire."

And now, here is Senator Pisano, managing editor of CANDIDO, promising further appearances by Walter Chiari (who has already confessed publicly, at the Venice film festival), Raimondo Vianello, and Pasquale Squitieri. Meantime, they are having barrels of fun publishing interviews with Alberto Lionello ("It's easy to do Brecht, a communist who expresses himself for the benefit of those stupid bourgeois who are ready to pay 30,000 lire to be insulted"), but also with "Drive in" comic Ezio Greggio and talk-show hostess Maria Giovanna Elmi, who is far too young to have experienced the [Salò] Republic or anything like it.

6182

CS0: 3528/29

## PCI SUFFERS FALLING-OUT, MOURNS THE FALLEN-AWAY

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 26 Oct 86 pp 14-15

[Article by Francesco De Vito and Guido Quaranta: "Falling-out"]

[Text] Divided over nuclear power plants, split over Alfa Romeo, at odds even over taxation of BOTs, the PCI is mired in the slough of despond. Symptom: 100,000 Party membership renewal cards unsold.

The final decision as to build or not to build more nuclear power plants has been postponed until after the national conference on energy, scheduled to meet in Rome at the end of this year. As for Alfa Romeo, there are those who would like to sell it to Ford, and those who would rather see FIAT take it over. Even on the recent move to tax BOTs, that spavined warhorse in the ongoing feud about return on investment, there is discord enough and to spare.

For some time now, every problem that surfaces turns—for the PCI—into a source of internal dissension. Its 17th congress, held last spring in Florence, which seemed to invigorate the party with renewed unity and purpose, plus a new and prestigious leader, now seems light-years away. Equally remote seems the general enthusiasm with which the PCI wound up its UNITA festival in Milan last September.

It was there that Alessandro Natta had prophesied, before a million PCI faithful, the start of a grand fall campaign. As of now, there has been no sign of General Natta's Napoleonic offensive.

Aside from Tuesday's strikes by the metalworkers over contract demands, which was 50-percent complete in some plants and 70-percent complete in others, no Italian town square has yet been packed by any mass demonstration. In Parliament, pending the imminent debate over the finance bill, there has been no memorable battle, no skirmish even approaching that status. In short, the PC's troops are still sullenly idle in barracks. Even worse, there have been alarming indications of mass defection in the offing.

One need only look, for example, at the numbers-count after the 1986 festival. Early estimates pointed to a drop of 8 percent or so: in absolute numbers, that works out to a loss of nearly 100,000 card-carrying members. In some major cities, like Rome, and in some areas in the Mezzogiorno, the loss exceeded 10 percent. To find voter apathy to match this you have to hark back to 1956 and the days of the Hungarian uprising. Furthermore, this is a loss that, when combined with the slow but steady erosion of recent years, puts the PCI right back where it was in 1971, when it could boast only 1,521,000 members.

Even sales of the party press, whose circulation goals were routinely met until now, wound up this year with dismal figures on subscription renewals: as of mid-October, instead of the anticipated 400 billion lire, the subscription take came to a mere smidgin over 30 billion. Cities like Milan, scene of the national UNITA festival, and others like Naples and Palermo, reaped only half the expected harvest. And Rome itself fell 50-percent short of its quota.

The decline in subscriptions and the contraction in revenues are only the most visible symptoms of a generalized malaise. There is also a third element, not nearly so visible, but every bit as ominous: I mean the slow, grinding, irreversible crumbling of the gigantic network of government functionaries who have always constituted the traditional framework of the party's complex bureaucratic machine. Aside from the traditionally Red regions, there seems to be what looks very much like a vocational crisis looming: The red plush carpeting that made party celibacy so cozy until a few years ago is beginning to show the warp. Rank-and-file salaries, for one thing, are very low; they never run as high as 200 million or even 1 million lire. If things are going well, they get paid on time, on the 27th of each month. If things are not going well, they get paid whenever...

The whole fault, the basic flaw, lies in policy-making, which has somehow metamorphosed into a smorgasborg of lesser arts, rather than carefully planned steps to untangle the twisted structures of the society, or even to remake the world... Or is that it? Might there be less cosmic mistakes that could be blamed, at least partially, on the PCI's general staff? One thing seems clear: during these past several weeks, the PCI leadership has not been marching in step and, when it does manage to move at all, it is because somebody else is pushing or pulling it.

Take, for instance, the question of nuclear power plants. Many party members are convinced that Natta's conversion from pro- to anti-nuclear advocate was precipitated by the recent fire-and-brimstone fallout on Socialist deputy secretary Claudio Martelli on the road to Nuremberg: a demonstration of subordinate status, and hence having nothing to do with the fact that it is perfectly all right to be either for or against building more nuclear power plants. And the grumbling and criticism that pervades the rank and file are growing louder, because the inevitable corollary to subordinate position is indecision: hence the postponement to December of any decision at all.



Yet another example: the 30-year anniversary of the Hungarian uprising: it took a signed editorial by Bettino Craxi in AVANTI! to bring Natta, who had, furthermore, just returned from a trip to Budapest, to come out in the open and say that Imre Nagy—the Hungarian prime minister tried and executed by the Soviets, "was most certainly a communist, and that his execution had been an unjust and inhuman act." Words which, to a lot of PC members, might have sounded a lot more convincing had they been forthcoming without so much outside solicitation from interested parties, like say, Craxi.

Looming now on the horizon is a third level of inferiority: this time, the issue concerns religious instruction in the lower grades. Many citizens find it paradoxical for the most outspoken foe of religious instruction in our time seems, for the nonce, to be Claudio Martelli, deputy secretary of a party whose leader, as prime minister 2 years ago, signed a new concordat, and just as recently rushed to the defense of public education minister Franca Falcucci, to whom we owe the implementation legislation.

These are errors made by a leadership team that, despite the general view in the aftermath of Florence, reveal a lack of consistency and which, despite all that was said at the Milan festival, betrays as well a flaccidity when quick response is called for. The truth of the matter is that no homogeneous summit has emerged around Natti. "We have all the voices we can listen to, except the one voice that can speak for the party," says Claudio Petruccioli, bitterly: Petruccioli, one of the sharpest members of the Central Committee, went on: "A few days ago, I called on Occhetto and I told him: "I don't know why they picked you to be sole coordinator of the secretariat, but, now that you are, try to do a decent job of it, rather than playing the party's juvenile lead."

As for those markedly sluggish reflexes, the top people on the Botteghe Oscure were alerted to Craxi's plot against them. Here is Luciano Barca's report:

"Four months ago we learned of a directive sent in the utmost secrecy by Craxi to the Socialist executive, ordering it to engage in a war of movement on all fronts and with every available weapon, with the specific objective of splitting the PCI and shifting the DC further to the right. It is a plan clearly devised to erode our electorate and to prove that, over and above the balance of power between us and them, Socialists must take over leadership of the left in Italy. Our party's summit, unfortunately, underestimated its potential impact."

6182

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## DISSENT GROWS AMONG ECOLOGY GROUPS

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 26 Oct 86 pp 259-262

[Article by Romeo Bassoli: "Green and Split"]

[Text] Inside the Italian ecology movement there is mounting disagreement between the fundamentalists and the reformists. At the core of the dispute the role technology should play in finding solutions to environmental problems. Is this split as serious as the one that developed in Germany?

There had already been some acerbic internal debate in some Green groups at the time local juntas were forming. Then, this summer, the Green councilman for Upper Adige, Alexander Langer, wrote two "scandalous" articles for MANIFESTO, in which he argued that the environmental movement ought to seek new allies in the pro-life movement begun by COMMUNION AND LIBERATION, and in those tiny rural communities that are unfairly burdened by the environmental protection laws, including, in top position, the Galasso Act. Chico Testa, president of the Environmental League, responded to that suggestion by return mail, again in MANIFESTO, that the ecology movement could not make alliances in these sectors of the political and civil sectors, but must, on the contrary, look hard at the great clash "between the market and the public interest."

To some observers, this might look like a fairly innovative summer-time argument, but the recent gathering in Pescara of Green candidates and the debate, which was sometimes heated, that broke out there unexpectedly revealed that the issue was something altogether different. In Italy, as has already happened in Germany and in parts of the United States, the environmental movement—by becoming an active interlocutor for the society, for the institutions, and for the mass media—has assumed a double nature. Two alignments, two world-views and conceptions, two disparate modes of candidacy for and employment by institutions clash head-on and, to quote Franco La Cecla's expression, "glaring at each other like quarreling dogs." Even though one and all declared their optimism at chances of avoiding the kind of rift that, in Germany, saw one of the founders of the Greens Party, Rudolph Bahro, stalk out and slam the door behind him: ("We must do as the Benedictines did in the Middle Ages, saving western culture by withdrawing into their self-sufficient monasteries," he said) and the whole movement plunge into crisis.

The Italian alignment pits on one side the fundamentalists (or non-violent Greens, as some describe them) concentrated around specialized publications, around the association (and magazine) Aam Terra Nuova, or QUADERNI D'ONTIGNANO (after a tiny abandoned village near Florence), or the network of producers and retail stores selling macrobiotic food throughout Italy. They advocate a return to the land, and embrace the "small is beautiful" ideology, self-sufficiency in food supply and food production, and alternate technologies.

"For us," says Franco La Cecla, long-time leader of the fundamentalists, "the most important thing is putting together networks of citizens who will organize independently of the state and depend as little as possible on its services."

Arrayed on the other side are the reformists (or realists), with the Environmental League, technicians like Gianni Mattioli, Massimo Scalia, Giorgio Nebbia, and the traditional environmental groups. Their ideals are those most familiar to the general public: renunciation of all nuclear weapons, new patterns of economic development based on energy conservation and increased employment, and gradual transition.

The former take their theoretical cue from Ivan Illich, known in Italy primarily for his views on deschoolarization and on Indian communities in Mexico. The latter find their spiritual counterpart in New York environmentalist Barry Commoner.

These two components have a recent past of very different choices and of roads taken or not taken. In 1975, when Carlo Donat Cattin, who was minister for industry at the time, introduced a plan to build 20 nuclear power plants (in addition to the one at Caorso), the traditional left was caught off-balance by a "weird" movement. The parties and labor unions which only 2 years earlier, during the Yom Kippur crisis, had fought to do away with dependency on oil by switching to nuclear power, were faced with a conglomerate of forces that included adherents of non-violence, conscientious objectors, believers in that anarchic-Anglo-Saxon thinking little known in Italy and practiced by intellectuals like Carlo Doglio.

"We were the first ones," recalls La Cecla, "to say "no!" to the nuclear plants, to organize demonstrations with the citizens of Montalto di Castro. Our teachings involved ethical and scientific principles which the Left could not understand."

Then came 1977, and everything changed. The movement during those years, in its socialist radicalism, discovered the fight against nuclear power. "The anti-nuclear struggle," we were told later by Gianni Mattioli and Massimo Scalia, that that was how beginning of their environmentalist course, "and it attracted most of the same people who had been activists back in 1968."

"But while the non-violent ecology group was committed to a non-centralist theory, to self-sufficiency, to productive autonomy for small groups of people," explains La Cecla, "Leftist environmentalism centered on the state, on the class struggle against the multinationals, and the takeover of institutions."

It was no accident that, during those same years, while the 1977 movement was burrowing into terrorism and only a few "enlightened" groups were still in the environmentalist forces and seeking to build a relationship between the environmentalists and the labor movement, the "non-violent Greens" were going back to the land, setting up their own forst networks of producers, and to the net-working magazines. "For us," says Giannozzo Pucci, a "fundamentalist" who now lives in the Tuscan countryside, "the main thing was not an alternative between nuclear and coal or nuclear and oil. What is needed is a network of very small plants that would supply the necessary minimum for a subsistence economy."

The disparity of outlook between the two wings of the movement broadened later in the 80s, when (especially with the birth of the Environmental League) even a handful of traditional leftists, with ties to the PCI and to the PSI, came in to broaden the alignments of the environmentalist movement.

That was when we started talking about Green slates, and that was also when the first polemics erupted over their role. The "fundamentalists" wanted to be free to dabble in every contest: "We must not cast ourselves in a government or opposition role, or in a Left-wing or Right-wing alignment," said Giannozzo Pucci.

This is a notion that finds a cool response with the "realist" wing, which believes, on the contrary, that this experimental political venture must mature in the "mainstream" of the left. Replies Environmental League president Chicco Testa, "We reject the fundamentalists' mathematical distinction between ethics and politics. There is the danger of sliding into ecological extremism, thereby dooming us to be an impotent institutional presence, simply because we are unfamiliar with the machinery of politics."

However, with more and more spotlights focused on the environmental movement (first with the favorable election returns in 1985 and then with the discussion and theorizing over Chernobyl) the first cracks began to open: there were splits over parks, over water-softeners, over the role of engineers. The differences among the environmentalist fundamentalists would affect many of the bulwarks behind the realists' arguments. "The truth is that the fundamentalists scorn science as a historical given," says Gianni Mattioli. "We realists do criticize science but, unlike them, we are not willing to abandon scientific rigor, and we are unwilling to settle for the outmoded mathematical models or for pie in the sky."

What will all this divergence lead to? According to spokesmen for both sides, optimism prevails. Franco La Cecla argues

that the non-violent people get out of their nests and sit down more frequently with the institutions, and that the 'realists' humbly admit that they must learn a lot more about the basic ideas that have always been those of the Greens slates."

Chicco Testa foresees "tensions at first, before and after the general elections, which will determine the nature and role of the Greenns slates of candidates." He hopes, though, that the "movement will steer clear of ideological disputes, We are all immunized against what happened during the 70s." All together, then, come what may?

"Just so it doesn't turn out like Pescara," says city-planner and environmentalist Fabrizio Giovanale, "when the people applauded with equal enthusiasm those who spoke in flat contradictions of one another. Were they telling us we were all right, accepting our diversity, or was it merely because they didn't understand a thing we were saying?"

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## RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ANGOLA SEEN PROBABLE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 15 Nov 86 pp 31R-32R

[Article by Rui Ramos]

[Excerpts] After 11 years of independence for the People's Republic of Angola, a new chapter may be beginning in relations between Luanda and Lisbon. There is currently an obvious thaw in their long-drawn-out dispute, which has been kept alive practically all this time by irreconcilable views on activities by UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] in Portugal.

At least that is the opinion of several observers in the Angolan capital, who have been attaching great importance to a number of events pointing to an opening-up in the direction, finally, of closer relations between the two countries.

Incidentally, and significantly, it is the Angolan ambassador to Lisbon who is emphasizing the new steps toward that rapprochement. "The doors are wide open on Angola's side," said Joao Mawete Baptista at a press conference marking the 11th anniversary of Angola's independence, and he explained that it was now up to Portugal to "clearly define its policy of interests."

That change in the Angolan diplomat's tone needs to be emphasized, since he has been noted until now for his "excessive preoccupation" with controlling activities by UNITA members based in Portugal to the detriment of the intended relaxation between Luanda and Lisbon. That attitude reportedly earned him an "admonition" from President Jose Eduardo dos Santos himself at the recent plenary meeting of Angolan ambassadors. This new emphasis in Joao Mawete Baptista's way of speaking is obviously linked to an event that would have been unthinkable even recently: the formulation of an invitation from Mario Soares to his Angolan counterpart to make an official visit to Portugal. That visit will probably take place in April or May of 1987.

#### Invitation at "Ideal Moment"

The emotional climate in Maputo probably helped considerably, and the feeling in Angolan circles is, in fact, that the Portuguese president chose "the ideal

moment" for his invitation at a time when the PS [Socialist Party] seemed to be moving away from closer relations with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in favor of Cavaco Silva's party. Nor are certain personal sympathies on Mario Soares' part being forgotten.

#### Favorable Winds

Portugal, whose actions on the African continent most often have no strategy behind them, now seems to be winning points as far as Angola is concerned, all the more since favorable winds are blowing from Luanda. This can be seen in the visits to South Korea, Brazil, and especially Portugal by Minister of State Pedro Van Dunem, who is also minister of energy and petroleum and a strenuous defender of a complete opening-up to capitalist countries.

There is a reason for Pedro Van Dunem's choice. The last time UNITA sabotaged the power stations supplying Luanda with energy, it was a Portuguese firm--ACTA--which began working day and night to the amazement of Angolans and Cubans, who became mere spectators. And the Portuguese worked so efficiently that the serious damage was repaired within a few days. That earned them great prestige among the Angolan authorities, so much so that they are now considered "model cooperants." And that image, incidentally, benefits Portuguese workers in Angola as a group, some of whom occupy key posts, as happens when it is necessary to repair the frequent breakdowns in Luanda's electricity network that are responsible for the almost constant power outages.

That and other factors, along with the erosion in Eastern cooperation--now considered "negative" by the Luanda government--may lead to real growth in trade between Angola and Portugal once Jose Eduardo dos Santos' pragmatic policy has stabilized. According to a high Angolan official close to the president of the People's Republic of Angola, the Hungarian advisers stationed in Luanda are playing a preponderant role in changing the MPLA's foreign economic policy and supporting the view that the "natural alliance" with the USSR is compatible with an opening-up to the West. In Luanda's jargon, this is what is described as "financing socialism with capitalism."

#### Theses in Confrontation

It is a strategy which may bring Angola the foreign investment it so badly needs now that foreign exchange earnings are at their lowest level and powerful SONANGOL--the state-owned National Angolan Fuel Company--is under the control of a reorganization committee that is looking into management errors and possible instances of corruption.

But other sources say that that "presidential line" is encountering strong animosity, almost always veiled, on the part of other groups represented in the MPLA's leadership. The name mentioned before all others is that of Roberto de Almeida, secretary for the ideological sphere and the man in charge of all information. He is the leader of what is called "black nationalism" (which is not a form of "negritude" but genuine "black identity" ["negrismo"], somewhat in the style of Duvalier)--a "debasement of negritude's theses," according to some Angolan intellectuals, which has "prevailed tragically" over

the multiracial theses of "Creole identity" that have been defended since the struggle for independence by Viriato da Cruz and the Pinto de Andrade brothers, among others, and which has resulted in the various manifestations of tribalism and racism both inside and outside the MPLA.

Also expressing itself, discreetly and without much energy, is the so-called Algerian group, which consists of a few mestizos not represented in the MPLA's leadership. This third wing, whose contours are poorly defined, may be headed by Henrique Santos "Onambwe," currently minister of energy and once the powerful chief of operations for DISA (the state security organization), although there is also mention of Colonel Iko Carreira, who, ironically, has just been appointed ambassador to Algeria.

In addition to those internal disagreements, the MPLA is currently confronted with other forces which either are hostile to it or are working to bring about greater internal tranquillity. They include the powerful Catholic Church, which has not wearied of calling for an end to the war and for reconciliation, and a movement in public opinion calling itself "independent democracy." It is responsible for the clandestine circulation of photocopies of the foreign press and, in the words of one of its members, "struggles alongside Catholics for peace, the multiparty system, balanced economic development, and respect for human rights in our country."

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## DIFFICULTY IN ATTRACTING, RETAINING QUALIFIED TEACHERS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22/23 Nov 86 p 13

[Article by Jens Holme, special correspondent of INFORMATION]

Text] According to earlier prognoses, Greenland would today be self-sufficient, as far as teachers are concerned. But, in actual fact, the Greenland school system is as Danish as ever and undermanned with discontented teachers in two rival trade unions.

"Greenland politicians are playing a dangerous game with the country's future. Its school teachers are treated so poorly as to affect the quality of the educational system."

This, at any rate, is the opinion of teachers in Greenland on the situation. They cite statistics to prove that they have lacked behind, as far as salary developments are concerned. And the recruitment of new teachers has almost come to a complete standstill.

Exactly 9 years ago, John Jensen, director of education in Greenland at the time, predicted in an interview with RITZAUS BUREAU that Greenland would be self-sufficient with regard to teachers in a decade--thus in 1987. The elementary school system would be the first important area requiring prolonged education which would become entirely safeguarded by Greenland teachers.

Today these prognoses have been frustrated and the predictions considerably more gloomy. Upwards of 50 percent of the qualified elementary school teachers in Greenland are still Danes who have been sent to Greenland--or who have been "called in" since the home-rule government took over. The teachers' college in Nuuk (Godthåb) has to advertise for students. And nobody really believes that Greenland will become self-sufficient, as far as teachers are concerned, until sometime after the turn of the century.

## Boycott

In many schools in the vast, sparsely populated country, there is an acute shortage of teachers on account of an effective boycott on the part of the

Danish National Union of Teachers. Last summer 140 teachers went back to Denmark and only about ten teachers traveled in the opposite direction to replace them.

The training of teachers is the highest level of education that may be carried through in Greenland without the need for the student to spend a certain amount of his study time in Denmark or other countries. That is why there is a vast demand for teachers for all kinds of other posts within the Greenland society. And pari passu with the declining real income of teachers, it has become increasingly easier to persuade teachers to give up teaching.

Inger Kleist, chairman of the purely Greenland union of teachers, Ilinniartits-isut Kattuffiat (IK), is worried that the Greenland school system may be on the point of becoming totally wrecked.

"Unless improvements in the conditions of the teachers as well as in the school system are launched immediately, we shall risk losing an entire generation. And, then, it will not merely become a question of a shortage of Greenland teachers. Greenland will, for a long time in the future, remain dependent upon Danes with higher educational backgrounds who are being called in, while we ourselves will have to make do with subordinate, unskilled jobs.

#### Disputes Among Unions of Teachers

Teachers in Greenland belong to two different and until recently rival unions. In 1978, members of IK left the Greenland National Union of Teachers (GLF), which is a subdivision of the Danish National Union of Teachers and which, by virtue of its association with the Central Organization of Teachers has the right to negotiate with the Danish state and the home-rule government.

According to Inger Kleist, the underlying reason for the break was that the Greenland National Union of Teachers was disinclined to comply with the wishes of the Greenland teachers for equal pay for teachers residing in Greenland and those who had been called in from Denmark.

Today IK has approximately 400 members, a considerable number of whom are temporarily appointed teachers without qualifications from a teachers' college. Danish teachers cannot become members of IK.

The Greenland National Union of Teachers, on the other hand, will accept as members teachers who have been called in from Denmark as well as teachers residing in Greenland. According to the deputy chairman, Peter Rasmussen, Ilulissat (Jakobshavn), the Greenland National Union of Teachers has 420 members, 120 of whom are natives of Greenland.

#### Two Pay Differences

Peter Rasmussen says that GLF agrees with IK that equal pay should be introduced for Danish and Greenland teachers. But to GLF it is equally important that the salaries of teachers in Greenland be raised to the same level as in Denmark.

The salary of a Danish teacher in Greenland is approximately 2,000 kroner less per month than that of a colleague at the same scale of pay in Denmark.

"The difference is due to the original tax exemption in Greenland. Of recent years, however, the rate of taxation has increased sharply. And anybody will be able to ascertain from studying prices in shops that living costs are considerably higher in Greenland. For that reason, it will, in the future, simply be impossible to attract Danish teachers to Greenland unless the differences in pay are corrected soon," says Peter Rasmussen.

Prior to the collective bargaining in 1985, teachers were under the impression that they had been promised considerable salary increases. However, on account of the low pay ceilings in Denmark, the Greenland government dared not comply with the promises made. Like other groups of employees within the public sector, teachers in Greenland were given a wage increase of 6 percent over 2 years.

This caused the Danish National Union of Teachers to lose its patience. Danish teachers have since then been discouraged from accepting jobs in Greenland. The boycott has been lifted following a letter last week from the premier of the Greenland government, Jonathan Motzfeldt, to the chairman of the Danish National Union of Teachers, Martin Rømer, in which Jonathan Motzfeldt made firm promises that the interests of teachers will be specially considered in the upcoming negotiations. Around Christmas time, the Greenland school system will launch a campaign in Denmark to recruit a sufficient number of teachers for the 1987-88 school year.

#### More Money and Free Water

One important problem will remain, however, viz. the considerable differential treatment of teachers who have been called in and locally recruited teachers.

Danish teachers are paid a so-called Greenland allowance ranging between 700 and 1,100 kroner monthly. In addition, 1,435 kroner monthly are paid toward a severance payment, which the Danish teacher will receive when returning to Denmark. Danish teachers, moreover, are entitled to an annual free trip with their families to Denmark. In addition, they may be granted free trips to Denmark in connection with serious illness or the death of a close relative.

Greenland teachers are only given one free trip every 5 years, irrespective of the fact that a trip, for example, from a settlement on the east coast of Greenland to the family in Nuuk may be equally costly as a trip from the Greenland capital to Copenhagen.

Peter Rasmussen, the Greenland National Union of Teachers, points out that Greenland teachers, on the other hand, receive salaries during their training as teachers, subsidies for their children's education in Denmark and are given access to low-cost housing and professional training loans.

On the other hand, Trutti Høj, member of the executive committee of IK and a teacher in Aasiaat (Egedesminde), points out an additional number of benefits only available to Danish teachers. They are, for example, ensured housing on

favorable conditions. In the settlements, Danish teachers have water brought to their houses practically free of charge, whereas their Greenland colleagues have to carry the water containers themselves and have to pay the bills for the water.

#### Not Enough to Make Ends Meet

A newly trained Greenland teacher receives a monthly salary of 9,500 kroner, and that is hardly enough to make ends meet, says Inger Kleist, chairman of IK.

"Twenty years ago, a teacher received a higher pay than a skilled laborer. Today, the pay of a teacher ranges between 50 percent and 75 percent of that of a skilled laborer. The result is, of course, that vast numbers of newly trained teachers leave their teaching jobs for other jobs which pay better. As a result of the shortage of Greenland teachers, schools in Greenland fail to comply with the commitment to have all education take place in the Greenland language during the first 3 years of schooling," says Inger Kleist, adding:

"The differential treatment appears the more unreasonable because we are given considerable additional work. We often have to work as unpaid interpreters for the Danish teachers and safeguard the contact with large numbers of parents who, on account of the language, cannot communicate with a Danish teacher."

#### Coldness in Teachers' Lounge

The exasperation among the Greenland teachers has resulted in Arctic coldness in several teachers' lounges. Greenland and Danish teachers keep to their own separate groups, says Trutti Høy.

"Greenland teachers, for example, find it difficult to understand that some of their Danish colleagues have stayed in Greenland for upwards of 20 years without having made the slightest effort to learn the language and, nevertheless, are able to maintain their privileges."

Even if IK finds it of utmost importance that equal pay be introduced as soon as possible, Inger Kleist and Trutti Høy, nevertheless, realize that this cannot take place all of a sudden. In the upcoming contract negotiations, IK will demand salary increases of 30 percent. However, as stated earlier, IK does not have the right to carry on independent negotiations. That right belongs to the Greenland National Teachers' Union and the Teachers' Central Organization.

As far as this issue is concerned, a solution, however, is in sight. A committee is expected to present its report on a Greenland civil servants' reform in early 1987. As of 1989, all civil servants in Greenland will belong to a Greenland civil servants' organization, which will safeguard the negotiations on salary and work conditions with the home-rule government.

At the same time, time limits will probably be set for how long Danes will be able to maintain their status as called-in civil servants. After 5 years, Danish civil servants in Greenland will have to decide for themselves whether they will want to go back to Denmark or continue on the same conditions as the locally recruited civil servants.

## Cooperation After All

With the formation of a special Greenland central organization for civil servants, the two teachers' unions will belong to the same organization. Which does not mean, however, that they will merge. Inger Kleist is of the opinion that for several years there will be a need for a separate union for Greenland teachers, because the native and called-in teachers in important areas have different interests.

However, after having fought each other for a number of years, the two teachers' unions last week entered into a cooperation agreement. Under that agreement, IK will be ensured the right of representation at the negotiating table already in the upcoming contract negotiations. The cooperation agreement says that "one of the primary objectives in the upcoming contract negotiations will be to take actual steps toward the achievement of equal pay for the same work, without any deterioration of the present wage and working conditions of any of the members of the two teachers' unions."

The Greenland National Teachers' Union and IK, at the same time, are agreed to work for an improvement of the elementary school system, so that its content will become less Danish and more Greenlandic.

IK, moreover, wants a reorganization and Greenlandization of the training of teachers. In admitting students to the teachers' college, the lack of a book-learning tradition in Greenland will be taken into consideration. The education will be less theoretical to reduce the large number of dropouts among students, says Inger Kleist.

"The majority of the teachers are Danish, and the education takes place almost exclusively on Danish conditions. The new education of teachers should instead be aimed at the future requirements and should aim at educating our children to live an ordinary Greenland life. And we shall have to have the largest possible number of students carry through their education as teachers."

Peter Rasmussen as well as Inger Kleist recognize that the problems of teachers, as far as deferred increases of salaries and differential treatment are concerned, are no singular phenomenae among civil servants in Greenland. The Greenland government consisting of the two parties 'to the left of the middle parties,' Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit, will be put on the rack once the contract negotiations start in the spring.

7262

CSO: 3613/31

## UNION ELECTIONS BRING CHARGES OF DISHONESTY

Madrid YA in Spanish 26 Nov 86 p 17

[Article by Jose Garrido]

[Text] The Workers Commissions (CCOO), the USO [Workers Trade Union, CTI [Confederation of Independent Workers] and the CSI [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions] agree in their proposals in passing judgment on the process of trade union elections. They all ask for the revision or cancellation of certificates of elections in small enterprises (from 6 to 10 workers) and argue that this is necessary in order to clarify the picture and establish the credibility of the existing election process. Despite being consulted by YA, the UGT [General Union of Workers] has not given its opinion.

The USO and the Confederation of Independent Workers are more emphatic about the problem of trade union elections. Manuel Zaguirre of the USO has stated that the election process "should be halted right now" and adds that it is preferable "for all trade union forces to meet and start all over once we have passed such a regulation, rejecting the existing one that allows all kinds of fraud." Ceferino Maeztu of the CTI states that "accepting as valid what has been done to date amounts to an attack on Spanish democracy."

CCOO sources told YA that the trial and jailing of the UGT election representative in Asturias cannot be taken as a mere isolated fact and that the growing deterioration of the election process requires the urgent adoption of antifraud measures to be applied retroactively, measures that could restore the transparency and credibility of elections characterized by "the strategic generalization of fraud by the UGT with the complicity of the administration."

"It is not acceptable," the CCOO say, "that the UGT officials, in the face of the tangible verification of fraud committed by them should react desperately saying that we 'also' commit fraud, giving as an example the presentation of 'a petition' before the courts."

#### Over 4,000 Reports

Agustin Moreno, secretary general of trade union action of the CCOO, notes that over 4,000 reports have been filed, 600 of them in Madrid and 400 in Malaga, for election fraud and that there have been at least 20 positive rulings in their favor.

The CCOO official also said that in Madrid, there is a UGT proxy who is the subject of a half dozen reports and who presented herself in the enterprises as a representative of the Ministry of Labor in order to conduct the census for the coming elections. Once the signatures of the persons with the most and least seniority and the enterprise seal had been obtained, she then filled out the papers and submitted them to the Provincial Election Commission as if the elections had actually been held in the enterprise.

He gave as an example the Montepio Traveling Salesmen and Commercial Representatives Security, a company with 15 workers where the proxy had appeared in September and where she was reported by workers. A meeting of the person in question and the workers of three enterprises who have instituted criminal proceedings against her has been scheduled. The three are the Bola Restaurant, the Uroblaz Enterprise and the Armenia Cafeteria.

Moreno also notes that there are enterprises with two different delegates, one from the UGT and the other from the CCOO. This is the case of Intertubos, where IMAC approved the UGT representative because of the mere fact that he appeared first.

#### Other Unions

Carlos Solas, secretary general of trade union action of the USO, says that the competition between the UGT and the CCOO was the catalyst that set off the war that will affect everyone, even those not to blame. Like Zaguirre, Solas emphasizes that the election process is corrupt at the root, particularly when a totally antidemocratic procedure is accepted from the beginning.

Both labor leaders agree that the courts should have halted the election process and open an investigation into the thousands of accusations filed, while at the same time reviewing one by one all the election certificates from companies with fewer than 10 workers.

"As a trade unionist, I am repulsed by the conduct of the elections," Zaguirre said, "because of the image being created for the workers and public opinion, an image that in the long run will hurt everyone." The war in which the two largest unions are involved, Zaguirre said, is "a clear attempt on the part of the PSOE to place its trade union confederation at the top."

Maeztu, secretary general of the Confederation of Independent Workers, notes that the situation is extremely serious and that it was foreseeable, inasmuch as nothing was done to prevent it. A thorough investigation into the matter, in the opinion of the CTI official, would result in a scandal of considerable magnitude. Maeztu supported total cancellation of the process.

Eustaquio Alcazar, president of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions, notes that the ethical thing in a democratic country would be to repeat the elections in enterprises with between 6 and 10 workers, where the highest incidence of fraud exists. The CSI claims it has concrete data from small companies where, without the previous consent of the workers, something required, elections had been called and delegates emerged who were not even from the company in question.

For its part, the CNT [National Confederation of Labor] supports halting the election process, which should have been done, sources in that union say, as soon as the administration gave the 4,144,000,000 pesetas to the trade union funds.

11,464

CSO: 3548/26



## GOL CRITICIZES CVP ON REGIONAL FINANCING ISSUES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 14 Nov 86 p 2

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Jean Gol by Charles Bricman, Guy Depas, and Guy Duplat; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] It is said that the government is undecided about the budget cuts to be imposed on the various regions and communities. Are the views of Flemish and French speakers fundamentally opposed on this matter?

[Answer] This is a fundamental question and far surpasses the technical problem of saving a few billion francs. As soon as you touch the financing of the regions and of the communities, you have touched the weak point of state reform, the essential point, but which is also the most difficult to deal with. I am a federalist. I know that we are moving toward an expanded transfer of power to the regions. However, I don't want that to be accompanied by a reduction in the means available to the French speaking people.

[Question] Are the Flemish asking for new powers, in return for tax refunds, which would be very favorable for Flanders?

[Answer] In Val-Duchesse they planned to ask for cuts in the grants to the regions and the communities. Taking into account the agreement reached on the debts involved in the social housing program and the stagnation in grants, we have already achieved a considerable part of these savings, amounting to some 3.0 to 3.5 billion francs. If we want to go further--and I am ready to discuss the matter--we must avoid preventing the effective functioning of these new institutions. However, it is also necessary to avoid, I repeat, harming the interests of the French speaking people. The proposals advanced in Flanders in effect are aimed at this objective. That is, in a less pernicious way, by transferring powers intended for the regions and the communities, but with financial resources derived from tax refunds. It should be appreciated that, by placing the ONE and the ONEm on a community basis, for example, that would mean 215 million more francs for Flanders and 215 million francs less for the French speakers. The other way of accomplishing this is even more pernicious. It consists of taking one more step in the reform of the state and in transferring new powers, while still using the mechanism of dividing resources between the communities, which is unfavorable for us.

[Question] Aren't you in favor of this broadening of powers devolved to the regions and communities?

[Answer] No. We are not asking for that under present conditions. If we should begin to discuss the purely technical problems involved in broadening the powers of the regions and communities at this time, without a proper division of financial resources, we would be moving along the same path, and tomorrow education might be placed on a community basis, resulting in a loss to us of billions of francs.

[Question] If you can't reach agreement within the government, are you in favor of ignoring the 3 billion francs in savings which remain to be made?

[Answer] We have fully paid the price of social peace. Why not pay the price of community peace, which is just as important? That is worth the trouble, the more so, I repeat, as this is not a technical problem but goes to the very heart of the reform of the state. If we want to make additional savings in the regions and the communities, after the new measures are agreed on, it will be necessary to find the real key to the financial resources provided to them. I have added things up: the French community and the Walloon region will receive 41 percent of the financial resources; the Flemish community, 53.5 percent; the Brussels area, 4.9 percent; and the German speaking community, 0.4 percent. Any solution to the present problem must preserve these percentages.

I Say No

[Question] However, is the CVP making this a question of principle?

[Answer] I have already said that I will not dance to the tune of the CVP. I do not wish to lose here and now one of the two great advantages which the French speaking people have. The second and related problem of finance is Brussels. Brussels has a right to its 2 billion francs in transitional grants. And it is essential to release these grants without any other conditions than those contained in the government statement. However, if the Flemish want to make us pay for these 2 billion francs with major concessions which prejudice the outcome of basic negotiations, I say no. The claims which I hear on the fusion of communes, the guaranteed positions of aldermen, and so forth, are worth much more than the 2 billion francs in question. The more the Happart affair appears to be a secondary issue, certainly reflecting other things, but a secondary matter even so, the more the real issue is the living flesh of our community. The French speaking liberals will not agree.

[Question] Do you favor releasing these transitional grants before the end of 1986?

[Answer] I don't want to be held to any specific dates. Some time in 1987 would also be acceptable. I repeat that Brussels has a right to this grant without any new conditions imposed.

[Question] Another community problem: public purchases and, in particular, the contract of the century for the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration].

[Answer] This question, in effect, is one of the very first which we must resolve before the end of 1986. In the case of the RTT, I think that we should submit the purchase to competitive bidding and ensure that maximum publicity is given to the contract in question and, in particular, to the assistance for research and development which it includes. And it will be necessary to analyze how Wallonia and Brussels will be able to take part in the research and development of these new products.

[Question] Would you want to open the RTT question to bids on a nationwide basis, along with bids for military equipment?

[Answer] I am not talking about specific arrangements to be made. However, at times it is contrary to economic logic to try to divide contracts between the various regions on a case by case basis. (I recall that it was Flag, in Flanders, who began this little game of dividing procurement decisions.) On the other hand, in connection with all public purchases, we must achieve a regional balance in terms of the economic spinoff.

[Question] There is another community question: what about the national economic sectors, and particularly the mines in Limbourg, which will have no money at all within 2 months?

[Answer] In this case I ask that each one show the same amount of courage. On the Walloon side, it is true that, after many disappointments, we have finally looked economic reality in the face. We closed down steel works. And while we were proving that we had this courage, the Flemish press never ceased harrassing us by demanding the closure of the tool industry. Now it is for Flanders to show the same kind of courage. Our public opinion and our press does not have as surly a disposition as the Flemish press. However, with regard to Limbourg, I don't intend to speak of closing down mines and reducing salaries, as we did in Liege and in Charleroi.

#### Taxation

[Question] The Flemish ask for a great deal everywhere. Tactically, is this very useful for the French speaking community?

[Answer] It is true that in terms of the financing of the various regions, of Brussels, of nationalized sectors, and even in connection with public purchases, it has been Flanders which has asked for a great deal. We are seeing them engage in an overall offensive. To deal with it, we must look at it on an overall basis, if we don't want to be considered naive. However, we must also take the long view. We should deal with these problems separately, without drifting into an overall negotiation which would stop work on everything else: the budget, jobs, the security of our citizens, etc.

[Question] Does everyone in the government think the same way as you?

[Answer] Wisdom and experience should convince everyone that, in a time of crisis, everything would have to be reconsidered. It would be much more difficult to begin again on jobs, the budget, and the market. The crisis would be all the more damaging since the austerity policy followed over the past few years has made it possible to begin to hope. We have just decided

on measures to stimulate employment and investments. We can move forward to a new stage in tax reduction.

[Question] When and how?

[Answer] We can talk about it at the time of preparation of the 1988 budget. It seems credible to me that there would then be a sufficient margin for maneuver to begin a second stage in tax reductions since the Grootjans Law was approved under the Fifth Martens Cabinet. This effort should move ahead simultaneously with the adoption of an overall plan for tax reform which would review all of the fiscal expenditures which we know of. Tax reductions should involve three major themes: limiting to 50 percent the maximum average tax. That would help in the recreation of a good climate for investors. Then it would be necessary to separate the incomes of husband and wife, reduce all tax rates, and raise the minimum level of income subject to tax.

5170

CSO: 3619/17

## NORDIC ECONOMIC UNITY NEEDS BOOST; EAST, WEST TRADE IMPROVES

## Exports Increase 13 Percent

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 86 pp 3, 34

[Article by Kristiina Ritvos: "Trade with West Revives Despite Forecasts; Metal, Paper, Wood and Clothing Sell Well Abroad"]

[Text] Foreign trade statistics indicate that Finland's trade with the West is reviving to the same extent as predictions in this country are becoming gloomier. In September exports increased 13 percent and imports 8 percent.

A large percentage of the September increase in exports was produced in the metal industry, whose own forecasts have been, mildly put, gloomy. In light of the statistics, wood, paper and clothing seem to have been selling surprisingly well abroad.

On the other hand, the chemical industry along with oil suffered from reduced prices and food industry exports were reduced by as much as a fourth.

In terms of export value we are still 6 percent behind last year's and 4 percent in terms of import value, but the reason is largely the drop in prices. The outlook for the Soviet trade is just the opposite: Exports were 14 percent behind last year's and imports 27 percent behind.

## Exports Gained Additional Momentum

Foreign trade gained additional momentum in September and both exports and imports surpassed the best figures for the year.

Exports increased 13 percent and amounted to 7.8 billion markkas. Imports increased 8 percent and amounted to 7.6 billion markkas.

Thus the foreign trade surplus increased again, totaling 2.2 billion markkas for January-September.

Cleared of fluctuations during the period in question, the export curve is now courageously clambering out of the abyss into which it had dropped during the months of the spring strike. Imports are also moving up a steepening slope. As concerns foreign trade, the third quarter of the year went almost as well as the Finance Ministry, accused of being overly hopeful, thought it would.

But it is uncertain whether things will continue to go as smoothly. In any event, economic statistics have so far brightened at the same rate that statements have gotten gloomier in this country.

Behind the strong growth of exports in September was the metal industry in particular, which has most sunk into gloom in terms of its economic prospects. Export sales of metal products and machines increased 36 percent in September and this brisk growth raised the entire volume of exports of the first half of the year to a wee bit on the plus side. Ship sales amounting to almost 700 million markkas were concluded in September.

Exports of wood products, paper and clothing also increased in September. Of the big industries only the chemical industry had to be content with more modest export figures than before. Along with oil, the reduced prices and the shutdown of the refineries are still felt.

The food industry has not gained momentum in its exports this year either and a fourth less sales were made than were a year ago.

The volume of capital goods imports in September came as a surprise; imports of them increased at an even swifter rate than those of consumer goods. Oil imports too increased fairly rapidly, to 800 million markkas in value.

#### Still a Deficit the Whole First Half of the Year

The trade figures for September are nicely improving the gray customs statistics of the first half of the year. Exports are already beginning to approach last year's volume, although export value is still 6 percent less than a year ago. Prices have, however, cut exports down by roughly 4 to 5 percent.


The export figures for both the paper and lumber industries are still several percent less than last year's. Actually, only clothing exports, in addition to exports of metal products and machines, have begun to increase a little.

The value of imports too was 4 percent less than a year ago in January-September. Naturally, it was reduced by oil, imports of which dropped immediately as early as half a year back. On the other hand, capital goods imports increased by nearly 10 percent during the first half of the year and consumer goods by 17 percent.

These past few months exports to Western Europe, especially the EFTA countries, have gained momentum. Exports to the Free Trade Association member nations increased by as much as 8 percent during the first half of the year. Exports to the Economic Community countries are still slightly less than last year's, but are already on the increase to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Spain and Belgium.

We are following the anticipated course in trade with the Soviet Union. Exports were 14 percent less than a year ago and imports 27 percent less. By the end

of September the problematic surplus had grown to nearly 2.7 billion markkas. This development promises us an export gap of about 4 billion by the end of the year.



Key:

1. Foreign trade.
2. Millions of markkas, seasonal equalization.
3. Exports.
4. Imports.

Most IVO Coal from USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Oct 86 p 34

[Text] In 1987 the Imatra Power Company (IVO) will buy nearly all the coal it needs from the Soviet Union. The company will probably import from about 400,000 to 500,000 tons of coal from our eastern neighbor.

On the other hand, IVO's coal imports from Poland will probably cease altogether next year. This year the company is importing over 400,000 tons of Polish coal into Finland.

A considerable portion of the imported coal will go into storage because IVO's big coal-powered plant, Inkoo, will probably be closed down for nearly a whole year. The shutdown is due to the fact that the company will be importing at least as much Soviet electricity as it is this year.

A total of about a million tons of steam coal is usually imported from the Soviet Union. This year imports will rise to 1.6 million tons and a total of 2.2 million tons in 1987. The biggest importer is Aspo Oy.

#### 4.7 Twh This Year

An agreement on electricity imports from the Soviet Union in 1987 was signed on Friday. According to the agreement, IVO will buy 4 terawatt hours in accordance with the 10-year agreement and, in addition, 0.6 terawatt hours of electricity in arrears during the early part of the decade.

Furthermore, IVO will be able to import up to 0.9 terawatt hours of additional electricity.

The additional imports will depend on, among other things, the output of the nuclear power plants, the amount of rainfall and how severe the winter is.

According to IVO production manager Kalervo Nurmimäki, 1986 electricity imports will increase to 4.7 terawatt hours.

This amount is composed of 4 terawatt hours of basic volume, 0.5 terawatt hours of electricity in arrears and 0.2 terawatt hours of additional imports. The additional volume could have been larger if the Soviet Union had not had difficulties in supplying it.

#### IVO Dissatisfied with Price of Electricity

According to Nurmimäki, IVO is not satisfied with the Soviet price for electricity. Next year IVO will have to pay the price stipulated in long-term agreements for its additional purchases, even though coal and crude oil prices, for example, have dropped to a considerable extent.

As far as is known, IVO has agreed to the price and the additional imports chiefly because of pressure from officials who regulate trade with the Soviets.

The company would be capable of producing electricity more cheaply at the Inkoo power plant, among others. At Inkoo the production cost would be from 8 to 9 pennies a kilowatt hour. Nurmimäki did not say what the cost of importing electricity will be, but it will probably cost considerably more than 10 pennies a kilowatt hour.

Nurmimäki stressed the fact that in 1987, aside from the production of domestic water-powered plants, IVO will be producing electricity solely with Soviet resources: uranium, coal or imported electricity.

"Those who heat with electricity can, in my opinion, sleep nights with a clear conscience; they will not be increasing the imbalance in the Soviet trade or unemployment -- the Soviet trade will not be improved with oil alone," was the way Nurmimäki put it on Friday.

IVO and the Soviets have not yet gotten to [negotiations] on the extension of the present long-term agreement which will end in 1989. The quarrel involves the price level. According to Nurmimäki, the partners do not agree on the index on the basis of which the price in the 1990's would be determined.

#### Nordic Economy: Actions, Attitudes Essential

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Oct 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Nordic Economic Cooperation Requires Practical Measures"]



[Text] There is more myth than truth in the economic potential of and cooperation among the Nordic countries. At a Finnish-Swedish Chamber of Commerce jubilee in Stockholm the general manager of Nokia, industrialist Kari Kairamo, warned that development is moving in a weaker direction and said that there is certainly no reason why it should.

Successful business operations guarantee people's economic and social security, which is at a high and comprehensive level in the Nordic countries. Increased uncertainty has been focused on businesses themselves. Will they in the future too be capable of providing for citizens' well-being as well as they have?

Industry's most important resource is people. According to the usual view, the industrial work force is better trained in Finland and the other Nordic countries than in most other countries. In Kairamo's opinion, this was true in the 1970's, but now we are losing that advantage both quantitatively and qualitatively. The importance of this high level of training is decreasing in relation to the leading industrial countries and our training has not been able to keep up with the swiftly growing demands imposed on it by new tasks.

The Nordic countries need to create much more far-reaching common labor markets so that they can gain greater advantages from their scanty human resources. In Kairamo's opinion, essentially connected with this is also the need for making research efforts in the Nordic countries more uniform and for developing them to better correspond to the needs of the labor world.

The legal obstacles in the way of real Nordic cooperation have also increased rather than decreased. Kairamo hoped for a new attitude too toward foreigners' right to own property in Finland. Then financially stronger Swedish companies could better help the weaker Finnish forest industry companies, in which case the Nordic countries' competitive position on world markets would also be improved.

As for Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine, he doubted that Finland has as much risk capital available as the full exploitation of its timber resources demands. Our country's forest industry has, nevertheless, often been criticized in past years for making such big increases in productivity that there has not been enough available timber and standing timber prices have risen to unrealistic levels.

The shortage of timber has indeed been largely due to forest owners' unwillingness to sell their timber. Considerably less timber has indeed for a long time now been cut than is grown in the forests. The Finnish forest industry's exceptionally large indebtedness and low profitability may in future constitute obstacles to an adequate ability to make investments in some companies.

Purchases of firms and extensive cooperative agreements transcending the borders of the Nordic countries still give rise to unwarranted doubts in the different countries. We cannot blame only the political decision-makers for the lack of a desire to cooperate economically in a more practical way for short-sighted and doubting attitudes subsist in the companies too.

The distance separating Finland and the other Nordic countries too from the leading industrial countries will inevitably grow unless we combat that danger together.

## FINANCE MINISTRY REPORTEDLY TO INCREASE INCOME TAX WITHHOLDINGS

Madrid YA in Spanish 25 Nov 86 p 14

[Text] Madrid--The Finance Ministry has sent to the Council of State the decree whereby it is intended, starting next year, to increase the withholdings and fractionated payments of the income tax for certain groups: business owners, farmers, professional people, artists, and annuitants. According to Finance Ministry estimates, the measure will affect a million taxpayers.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance has starting taking suitable steps to raise the withholdings of income tax of individuals in certain groups: business owners, professional people, artists, farmers, and annuitants. The decree that will make this possible, starting on 1 January 1987, has been sent to the Council of State so that it may issue the pertinent report before its passage through the Council of Ministers.

The decree, which expounds the provisions contained in the general state budgets for 1987 on increased withholdings and fractionated payments, stipulates that the withholdings for investment returns will rise from 18 to 20 percent as of 1 January. This applies to gifts and other remuneration in kind received on occasion by clients of certain banks and savings institutions, as a result of the tax system law on certain financial assets.

The new regulation also stipulates that the withholdings for income from professional activities, as well as the income of artists, will increase from 5 to 10 percent; in other words, they will be doubled. There is also a similar increment in the case of fractionated payments for activities of business owners and farmers, which will change from 10 percent, or a lesser percentage in cases of a single objective estimate system, to 20 percent.

The increase in withholdings and fractionated payments had already been announced by the minister of economy, Carlos Solchaga, when he submitted the general state budgets. The innovation now is its transmission to the Council of State. As Finance Ministry sources have explained to YA, this measure is aimed essentially at balancing the level of withholdings to which earned income is subjected with that of the other groups; in other words, giving both types of income the same treatment. According to Finance Ministry information, at the present time the withholdings for earned income exceed 90 percent of the

total that the workers have to pay at the end of the fiscal year, whereas, for the other types of income, this percentage is reduced to slightly over 40 percent.

In the submission of the general state budgets for 1987, it was explained, precisely, that these changes do not entail a rise in the total amount to be paid by these taxpayers; because the goal that is being sought is to achieve greater adaptation between the withholdings and fractionated payments and the tax debt for this type of income, and to prevent the appearance of highly differentiated rates. By so doing, another step is being taken in the battle against tax fraud, while at the same time, understandably, increasing what is received by the Finance Ministry in advance; although the ministry's officials give priority to the reasons involving the balancing of the percentages with those of the withholdings from earned income, as we have already noted.

#### There Will Be No Changes in Earned Income

During 1986, precisely, earned income underwent a change in the opposite direction, whereas now this is being corrected, with a reduction in the withholdings for the IRPF [Individual Income Tax]. For next year, at least at present, no further changes are being planned which could affect earned income, as the department officials have claimed.

Moreover, the preliminary estimates on what has been collected during the second declaration period by the IRPF indicate that the total collections during this second period amount to approximately 78 billion pesetas; representing a 15 percent increase over last year. The revenue based on income as of 30 September, before the end of the period for those who opted for fractionated payment and without accounting, hence, the amount relating to this second period, totaled 1.236 trillion pesetas.

2909

CSO: 3548/27

## INCREASE REPORTED IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEFICIT

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 19 Nov 86 p 73

[Text] Madrid--The decontrol of imports from the EEC countries has been causing a considerable increase in entries of agricultural products from abroad. The Spanish agrarian deficit nearly doubled during the first 9 months of the year. Some livestock sectors have been most harmed.

The Spanish agrarian deficit with foreign countries has almost doubled in the first 9 months of this year, showing negative results amounting to 92.615 billion pesetas during that period, in comparison with 56.557 billion for the same period of the previous year. The large imports of certain food products, particularly those from the European Economic Community countries, have in some instances raised agricultural product imports to levels unprecedented in the Spanish economy.

This year, the impact of imports has been heaviest on the most sensitive products of Spanish agriculture, such as livestock and milk, and their by-products.

Meat: Massive Entries

Meat imports are the ones showing the most dynamism. During these first 9 months of 1986, the value of live animal entries has almost tripled; while imports of meat for consumption and its by-products exceeded 28 billion pesetas by the end of September, with a nearly 88 percent increase over the same period last year.

In certain livestock sectors, the imports are already causing some problems for national production, for example in the case of pork, a type of meat which, as a whole, will see imports exceeding 100,000 tons this year, despite the fact that Spain is the second-ranking producer of this kind of meat among EEC members. Pork imports are causing price problems in the sector, while exports are banned on the Community markets because of the terms of the Spanish Community agreement.

In the first 9 months, imports of milk and dairy products totaled over 23 billion pesetas; a figure also representing some very large entries of products, with a 66 percent hike over imports by the same date a year ago. The milk imports are based upon the first years of Spain's membership in the EEC, although the imports coming from the Community have been quite considerable in the case of derived products.

## Fish Imports

Something similar has been occurring with fish purchases, the largest in volume, amounting to over 67 billion pesetas during these first 9 months of the year.

These large imports of products from the agro-food sector have been causing a high level of supply on the Spanish market in some instances; among other things, because exports of agricultural products have been behaving with considerable moderation, especially in the case of products derived from the livestock industry wherein, besides the fact that there is no exporting tradition, the export potential is limited for contractual reasons in some cases, such as that of pork, owing to the disease affecting this livestock sector which, yesterday, prompted the granting of Community assistance to the Spanish livestock industry to eradicate this disease.

## Trade for Certain Staple Products

(January-September 1986)

| Products             | Millions of Pesetas |         |                |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------|----------------|
|                      | 1985                | 1986    | % of Variation |
| Livestock            | 6,181               | 16,378  | 164.9          |
| Meat                 | 15,097              | 28,334  | 87.7           |
| Milk and by-products | 14,090              | 23,426  | 66.3           |
| Fish                 | 46,908              | 67,327  | 43.5           |
| Grains               | 72,319              | 45,874  | -36.6          |
| Fodder               | 29,243              | 31,169  | 6.6            |
| Total for Food:      | 514,082             | 537,607 | 4.6            |

2909

CSO: 3548/27

## INCREASE SEEN IN NUMBER OF SALARIED JOBS

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 3 Dec 86 p 64

[Article by G.M.]

[Text] Statistics on salaried jobs reflect an increase of 394,100 jobs in the last year studied, running from the third quarter of 1985 to July-September of this year. The improvement mainly comes in services, construction, the private sector and among young people. As a result, unemployment has dropped in 14 autonomous communities and the increase has remained steady in 3 others, according to the latest statistics from the National Institute of Statistics (INE).

Results of the survey of the active population (EPA) during the third quarter, completed by the INE among some 60,000 families, indicate that the trends begun after the second quarter of 1985 have continued. Since the summer of last year, these official statistics show that the improvement in employment compensates for the greater increases in the population available for work, to the point that unemployment has begun to drop in an apparently lasting manner.

The increase in the number of wage earners -- one of the most significant variables in taking the pulse of economic activity -- has gone beyond the most optimistic predictions of the government and the Bank of Spain, which predicted an increase of about 4 percent for 1986. With the reservations inherent in changes introduced in the EPA starting in the second quarter of 1985 -- groundless, according to official sources in the Ministry of Economy and Finance -- statistics show that wage earners in the private sector increased in July, August and September by some 118,500 and those in the public sector by another 21,500.

In the last annual period studied -- the third quarter of 1986 over the same period in 1985 -- the number of wage earners rose by 394,100, reaching a total of 7,739,300, an increase of 5.3 percent. The private sector has increased its ranks by 310,000 persons and the public sector by 84,100, the latter figure presuming a drop compared with last year's rolls.

By sector, those generating the most salaried jobs were services, with 275,800 net jobs (4.2 million), construction, with another 85,700 (up to

.6 million) and industry, with 46,700 (up to 2.3 million). In contrast, agriculture lost 13,400 wage-earning jobs.

#### Unemployment in the 17 Autonomous Communities

|                        | 1) Tercer trimestre de 1986 | 2) Varones       | 3) Mujeres       | 4) Tasa s/ población activa | 5) Tasa de paro en el tercer trimestre de 1985 |
|------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|--|
|                        | Total                       |                  |                  |                             |  |
| Andalucía              | 487.710                     | 235.120          | 252.600          | 30,56                       | 29,89  |
| Aragón                 | 95.890                      | 46.820           | 49.070           | 15,79                       | 17,71  |
| Baleares               | 50.580                      | 24.560           | 26.020           | 10,87                       | 11,86  |
| Canarias               | 102.740                     | 49.960           | 52.770           | 25,95                       | 27,55  |
| Cantabria              | 39.800                      | 19.130           | 20.670           | 17,48                       | 15,85  |
| Castilla-La Mancha     | 128.750                     | 63.230           | 65.520           | 15,12                       | 16,46  |
| Castilla y León        | 204.780                     | 101.610          | 103.170          | 17,63                       | 17,81  |
| Cataluña               | 456.090                     | 220.470          | 235.620          | 21,19                       | 22,70  |
| C. Valenciana          | 277.670                     | 133.350          | 144.320          | 20,69                       | 22,14  |
| Extremadura            | 83.790                      | 40.800           | 42.990           | 26,43                       | 26,60  |
| Galicia                | 219.080                     | 102.970          | 116.110          | 13,36                       | 12,57  |
| Madrid                 | 362.410                     | 168.410          | 193.990          | 19,32                       | 21,38  |
| Murcia                 | 72.010                      | 34.350           | 37.660           | 20,31                       | 20,49  |
| Navarra                | 39.970                      | 19.760           | 20.210           | 18,79                       | 18,97  |
| País Vasco             | 164.470                     | 79.930           | 84.530           | 23,99                       | 24,88  |
| Principado de Asturias | 88.470                      | 41.780           | 46.690           | 19,06                       | 18,72  |
| Rioja (La)             | 20.340                      | 9.990            | 10.350           | 14,14                       | 17,59  |
| <b>Total</b>           | <b>2.894.550</b>            | <b>1.392.250</b> | <b>1.502.300</b> | <b>21,11</b>                | <b>21,78</b>                                   |

Source: Put together with the National Institute of Statistics' own data.

Key:

1. Third quarter of 1986 2. Men 3. Women 4. Percentage of active population 5. Rate of unemployment in third quarter of 1985

#### Checks on Employment

Judging by the statistics, this progress was hindered when it came time to measure total employment, by factors such as the drop of some 80,000 persons among those employed in family businesses, almost all of them in agriculture, and by the drop of another 37,600 in the number of businessmen and independent workers.

All things considered, total employment -- the Ministry of Economy hopes to end the year with an increase of over 200,000 persons -- has grown over the past four quarters by 285,000 persons. By sector, the extremes have come in agriculture, with a loss of 190,400 jobs, and services, with an increase of 344,600.

Consequently, despite increases in the active population or the population available for work, unemployment has dropped since the middle of last year in all quarters except the last quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of 1986, usually the worst in Spain because of reduced activity in agriculture, tourism

and construction. Specifically speaking, unemployment dropped by 3,200 persons during the third quarter of 1985, by another 86,300 during the second quarter of 1986 and 37,600 during the third quarter of 1986. These reductions were greater than the increase in unemployment in the bad quarters. The last annual period studied -- which computation allows one to obviate the noted seasonality -- gives 36,700 fewer unemployed persons.

Ministry of Economy and Finance sources emphasized yesterday that the changes gradually introduced in the EPA starting in the second quarter of 1985, which could subtract homogeneity from those statistics during the six following quarters, contain minimal differences between the old and new series. Whatever the case, the INE has ceased publishing -- not drafting -- the data based on the old series, as a result of which there exists only the Economy version.

From the new official series, one learns that the unemployment rate based on the active population dropped during the last annual period in 14 autonomous communities, everywhere except in Andalusia, Galicia and Asturias, where increases of about 1 point has remained. Throughout the country, where the administration has just set the goal of reducing the rate by 1 point this year (to 21 percent), the drop was from 21.78 to 21.11 percent between the third quarter of 1985 and the same period of 1986.

The statistical increase in unemployment has only affected women since last year. Among women, there are 33,600 more out of jobs over the past four quarters. In contrast, unemployment has dropped among men by 70,400.

11,464

CSO: 3548/26



## DE DONNEA PLANS REFORMS FOR NATIONAL GENDARMERIE

## De Donnea on Problems

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4/5 Oct 86 pp 1, 3

[Article by Alain Gullaume: "De Donnea Launches His Sweeping Reform in the Gendarmerie"]

[Text] Nineteen eighty-six: a dark year for the gendarmerie, with the emergence of terrorism, the return of the Brabant murderers, the Heysel tragedy, all of which incontestably demonstrate that the elite corps has fallen ill.

Nineteen eighty-six: a year of hope for the gendarmeries? We are tempted to believe so, given the "state of the question" which has just been undertaken by the minister for defense, Francois-Xavier de Donnea, concerning the reforms instituted in the gendarmerie....

A little more than a year ago, the government requested a private company to conduct an audit on the state of our police and the reforms which could improve their efficacy.

Within two months, the results of this study will be made public. . .however, Francois-Xavier de Donnea does not want to wait. "My role," he explained yesterday "is to provide to the other responsible ministers, my colleagues at the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, an effective and even high-powered tool."

"It will now be possible to go in this direction, and urgent to institute a series of clear and unavoidable reforms, the usefulness of which can be seen even without an audit."

However, "the state of the question" conducted by the minister for defense has rapidly taken on the appearance of an indictment.

An even worse indictment, perhaps, because all the criticisms made in Parliament or in the press after the great tragedies of 1985: "The means available to the gendarmerie were not adapted to the challenges of more aggressive criminality and blind terrorism (. . .) Certain aspects of the remuneration

of gendarmes were inadequate; these inadequacies must be alleviated and the most marked weaknesses of the gendarmes' emoluments must be remedied (. . .) It is true that certain young officers have experienced difficulty in finding the correct attitude in the execution of orders. There is a problem of training and maturity which should be analyzed (. . .) It is true that the gendarmerie's disciplinary system has certain awkward elements which are capable of being improved (. . .) The average age of the mobile unit's vans and buses is 20 years (. . .) This situation is hardly better in terms of ratios in the mobile units, where, except for the radios in the mobile units, the average age is around 15 years(. . .) Increasing the numbers is not sufficient (. . .) It is also necessary to rationalize and to adapt the structures to the development of missions (. . .) The demoralization of the personnel is frequently caused by a lack of information and communication.

This is a terrible indictment. Everything occurs there: the selection of gendarmes, their training, their supervision, their organization, their equipment, their work atmosphere. However, this is not a condemnation. Francois-Xavier de Donnea is clear: "I refuse to speak, as some have, of ruination and collapse." However, a great lift will be given to the elite corps. Of course, this will not be like passing a magic wand (. . .) and certain reforms already underway will not be in effect until at least two years from now.

Face-life or revolution?

Helter-skelter (it is impossible to describe everything), the minister for defense decided, along with the gendarmerie's chief of staff, after having contacted union representatives, to change many of the gendarmes' practices and to give them a large amount of new equipment. . . . In addition to the purchase of large amounts of equipment (which we previously noted in our . . . editions), the command structures and their organization will be modified; several hundred servicemen will go into the gendarmerie to carry out administrative and logistical jobs every year. 400 volunteer (specially trained) militiamen can serve in the gendarmerie; additional employment opportunities will be in effect starting in 1987; the physical requirements for admission have been relaxed, although training will be improved; the employment opportunities for women in the gendarmerie will be improved; gendarmes' pay will be revised upward, among other things for the purpose of aligning gendarmes' salaries with those of the police; although "net," they will always be minimal, certain bonuses (for working at night or on the weekend) will be increased; to improve communication, "relations officers" will analyze the elements which affect gendarmes' morale and improve their access to information; continuing education of personnel will be revised and intensified (among other things) with regard to police tactics, maintenance of law and order, shooting; the budget for the gendarmerie will be modified (a 4 percent increase in the budget as compared to 1986); investing will be planned in the most rational fashion; expenditures will be undertaken according to new procedures; disciplinary procedures will be reduced. . . . In summary, instead of a face-life, a gentle revolution will be proposed for the gendarmes.

## The Gendarmes Must Remain Servicemen

The question of military status accorded to the gendarmes remains and some members of Parliament would like to remove it. "Not possible," responded Mr de Donnea. . . , because, although this rule actually offers some drawbacks, it also offers many advantages (organization, training, command procedures, intervention techniques, political and union independence, monitoring structures. . . . In addition, the maintenance of war missions by the gendarmerie also requires military preparation and training during peacetime.

Holders of political power have undoubtedly never shown to this extent, and with such realism, the weakness of the gendarmerie. This time, energetic recover measures--as energetic as possible--have been taken. Before knowing if they will be effective of sufficient, the gendarmes can, in any case, hope.

### Commentator on Gendarmerie

Brussels LE SOIR in French 4/5 Oct 86 p 3

[Commentary by Rene' Haquin: "Ministerial Diagnosis of the Health of the Corps"]

[Text] For more than 10 years, complaints have often been made about the indifference of the political world with regard to the gendarmerie, more accustomed to requiring it to operate than to worrying about it by providing funds and monitoring its activities. Recently, during the Marche-en-Famenne union congress, many political authorities displayed ignorance of current problems. On several occasions, the gendarme unions have criticized the political world of having abandoned them.

Like an athlete who has become obese, the gendarmerie, powerful to the point of occasionally having been dangerous, is now out of breath: discouragement and demoralization of the personnel, worn-out basic equipment, successive, occasionally dismantling, reorganizations, fatigue of the personnel and deep dissatisfaction with the refusal of the government to meet the demand for social benefits. . . .

Since 1970, the gendarmerie has wanted to respond alone to the new challenges of society: the fight against drugs, terrorism, crime, everyday violence, unsafe highways, troublesome experimentation--occasionally painful, as during the Francois affair--with risky police methods (. . .) It was necessary to have lived through a dark year, the year of Heysel, terrorist attacks, and the return of the Brabant murderers, so that we would no longer hum as before that "Everything's going well, thank you. . ."

It is necessary to have had the commission of inquiry on the Heysel tragedy, important steps taken by the government concerning security, the support of the military at the end of the year for the powers-that-be to be aware of the weaknesses of the giant.

For the first time, a minister for defense has realistically concerned himself with the gendarmerie and announced, that along with his colleagues at the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, the two other principle "users" of the gendarmerie, he interrupted a procedure for consultation and working out of the budget which, in previous years, was often voted on without discussion, after superficial examination by the parliamentary defense committees. Mr de Donne goes even further because he intends to improve material conditions, close the gap separating officers from the subordinates, relax the disciplinary system, modernize weapons, equipment and transportation, facilitate recruitment, review officer training and coordinate the activities of the gendarmerie relative to those of other police, primarily local and judicial.

This is an extensive program in which the reorganizations in progress decided on by the current command has been included. The minister for defense has supported them, by forcefully reaffirming the military character of the gendarmerie and the versatility of the gendarme, who must be and feel both like a policeman-soldier and a citizen.

Later on, when conclusions on the police audit requested last year by the government will be drawn, the responsible political authorities will have to redefine the missions of the different corps to reduce or even eliminate duplications and reinforce their specific ability not only to confront the current challenges, but also to restore service to the public.

13146/12851  
CSO: 3619/6

## MODERNIZATION, REORGANIZATION SCHEDULED FOR GENDARMERY

Brussels VOX in French 30 Oct 86 p 6

[Speech by Minister of National Defense Alfred Vreven at press conference held on 2 October at the Club Prince Albert in Brussels]

[Text] To carry out its various missions, the Belgian Gendarmery has 667 officers and 14,318 non-commissioned officers in its Operational Corps, who are assisted by 48 officers and 520 non-commissioned officers from other elements of the armed forces. It has nearly 4,000 vehicles which annually travel about 60 million kilometers.

The basic arms carried by the Gendarmery are light weapons: the GP 9 mm, FAL rifles, and Uzi submachineguns.

In view of the changes in the missions assigned to it (a more aggressive form of crime and blind terrorism) it has become necessary to adapt its structures and procedures. The government has resolutely committed itself to improving the equipment and adapting the structure and operating procedures of the Gendarmery.

## Human Resources

What principally characterizes the Gendarmery is the variety of its skills in carrying out its multiple missions, which combine those of a policeman, a soldier, and a citizen among other citizens. Although the theoretical weekly work week of a gendarme is limited to 38 hours, it should be remarked that the hours worked by an average trooper are very irregular and involve many hours of overtime.

On 1 January 1985 the Gendarmery was generally short of personnel. That is why the government decided in 1985: to permit the recruitment of 180 more gendarmes in 1985 as well as in 1986; over a period of 5 years, to bring military personnel assigned to duty in the Gendarmery to a level planned for administrative and logistical cadre; and to authorize the Gendarmery to increase the number of personnel in basic or advanced training until they are equal to 10 percent of authorized strength.

Bringing members of the militia into service in the Gendarmery is part of the general improvement in the quality of military service approved by the

government. Furthermore, this is aimed at permitting members of the militia to be assigned to the Gendarmerie reserve when they complete their service. This will make it possible to recruit the Gendarmerie from military personnel who already have a good idea of the organization and way in which the Gendarmerie carries out its essential missions. For the most part the conditions for the assignment of military personnel to the Gendarmerie would be the same as those expected from candidates for direct entry into the Gendarmerie (volunteers having the necessary moral and physical qualifications).

While the government has taken action to improve security conditions affecting its citizens, it has not neglected the security of members of the Gendarmerie itself. It is clear that improving the quality of the arms and equipment of the Gendarmerie will not only make it possible for the gendarmes to protect their fellow citizens more effectively but will also make it possible for them to do so with less risk. The replacement of closed pistol holsters with open holsters, the general issue of the more powerful 9 mm pistol, the increase in the number of submachineguns, and the purchase of riot guns and of bullet proof vests are actions which should provide better protection for the gendarmes.

#### Equipment

The government is not satisfied with merely taking action to improve personnel conditions in the Gendarmerie. It has also taken action to improve the logistical resources available to the Gendarmerie. It has been decided to increase the investment budget of the Gendarmerie to make it possible to improve its equipment more generally. The supplementary budget allocations involved thereby amount to 473.3 million francs for 1986 and 621.2 million francs for 1987.

The first concrete results can already be seen. A first group of 210 new small trucks for the reserve brigades of the Gendarmerie has already been delivered. The complete replacement of 7.65 mm caliber pistols by 9 mm caliber pistols has practically been accomplished.

#### Operational Status

It is clear that recent developments in terms of violent crime and terrorism, accompanied by frequent security patrols, have required the commitment of more substantial human and logistical resources.

In this area several reforms have already been carried out:

--The General Staff of the Gendarmerie has been restructured by removing its operational commitments and by establishing a carefully thought out research and planning service. In addition to the special operations squadron, generally called Squadron "Diane," special regional units of the same type have been established but with more substantial missions and resources assigned to them. The highway police have been reorganized in order to reduce the time required for them to take action and to involve them in the struggle against violent crime. Mobile units have also just been reorganized. These new organizations were placed in service on 1 September. In the course of

taking all of this action, the organization of the reserve units has not been neglected. An overall study is presently under way.

However, the operational capability of the Gendarmery is not solely a function of its organizational structure but also relates to the motivation of its personnel. Aware of the fact that the lack of motivation is often due to a lack of information and of contact, certain officers have been specifically charged with relationships within each group, in addition to committees handling contact and information. They have the mission of actively seeking to identify information needs and matters influencing the motivation of the gendarmes, on the one hand, and to transmit to them the necessary or desired information, on the other hand.

#### Conclusion

It is necessary to recognize that problems existed and still exist regarding the working conditions of the gendarmes, the state of their equipment, and the organization and coordination of police services.

Police work in all these aspects demands integrity, impartiality, care, but also flexibility, the ability to control oneself under any conditions, skill, and the ability to work methodically in using the resources available.

Aware of these difficult working conditions and problems in the field of pay and allowances, the government and the high command of the Gendarmery have also taken the necessary action. I intend to continue the effort already undertaken and to work to achieve an improvement in the personal situation affecting members of the Gendarmery.

5170

CSO: 3619/15

## MISSION, ORGANIZATION OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE RESERVE FORCE

## Major Function of Reserves

Brussels VOX in French 13 Nov 86 pp 8, 9]

[Text] On 25 October 1986 Maj (General Staff) Housiaux de Peutie welcomed 80 senior officers to a program covering 6 hours of conferences and discussions on the DMT (Military Defense of Belgium) in case of armed conflict. Belgium, which is well provided with a most varied kind of modern infrastructure, in effect is an ideal platform for serving as a kind of springboard between Great Britain and Ireland, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, and the potential combat area. Such a role cannot be handled in an improvised way. The reception of allied units, their preparation for combat, and their transportation to the combat area must be planned in advance.

In his introduction to the program, Lieutenant General Deconinck, commander of Belgian Interior Forces (FI), welcomed the officers present and reviewed the program for the day.

The different presentations aimed principally at describing the support which the FI would provide to the lines of communications of the allied forces, as well as the assembly points in Belgium of the different allied units debarking in our country. In effect, Belgium is the principal communications zone for allied military operations in Europe.

The military defense of Belgium will be accomplished by reserve units. As the general recalled at the end of his introduction to the program, "their effectiveness and their coordination with the allied powers have been strengthened in the course of the past few years."

## The Military Defense of Belgium

What does the military defense of Belgium involve? The DMT is the sum total of the military measures taken within Belgium to oppose the activities of hostile units coming from outside the country and/or organized within Belgium by an enemy planning or carrying out an act of aggression. The military defense of Belgium comes under the command of the commander of the Belgian Forces of the Interior.



The missions of the units taking part in the military defense of Belgium are the following:

--Ground defense, including a system of intelligence and alert, air defense, and CBN [Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear] defense;

--The protection of national and allied lines of communications.

In this context, it is important to emphasize that the maintenance and reestablishment of public order, even in time of war, depend on the civil authorities or the Gendarmery. Therefore, this is not part of the military defense of Belgium. Forces taking part in the DMT cannot take part in the maintenance of order except at the express request of the civil authorities and under the control of the Gendarmery.

Ground defense includes three kinds of missions: the organization of a network of intelligence and alert, the protection and freeing of vulnerable and vital points, as well as operations for finding, surrounding, and destroying an enemy force once identified.

By vital point we mean any installation essential to the maintenance of public order and the economic and social life of the nation. Responsibility for the protection of such vital points and their being kept free falls on the civil authorities. A vulnerable point in time of war is any establishment or installation considered essential for the military aspects of defense.

#### Organization of the Military Defense of Belgium

DMT units are the resources provided to the commander of the Forces of the Interior to permit him to carry out his mission for the military defense of Belgium. Nearly all of these are reserve units. Other Belgian and allied units stationed in Belgium could participate in the military defense of Belgium, under certain conditions. The participation of the Gendarmery in the DMT is subject to strict and carefully determined conditions and will be carried out principally in the collection of intelligence. Above all, the Gendarmery must remain the specialized means used by the civil authorities to maintain public order.

Regarding the DMT, the commander of the Forces of the Interior has a certain number of motorized, light infantry regiments of two different types: at the national level there are two infantry regiments with distinct composition intended to operate in the northern and southern parts of the country, respectively. These two regiments (as well as a few guard battalions of national or allied units) make up the reserve available to the commander of the Forces of the Interior. Under certain circumstances the Para-Commando Regiment and an armored reconnaissance squadron could also take part in the accomplishment of the DMT. Furthermore, each province has a provincial regiment. Its composition differs in terms of the strategic importance of the province concerned. In principle such regiments have infantry guard units to protect vulnerable and vital points, light infantry to go rapidly into action wherever that is considered necessary within a province, reconnaissance units charged with finding and locating the enemy, and para-commando units charged with destroying the enemy after he has been located, in coordination with

other type units. Tactical battalion staffs will take control of a certain number of units required to operate jointly. The DMT as a whole is supported by engineering and communications units of the Forces of the Interior.

#### Operations

DMT operations include the establishment of an intelligence and warning system, the protection of vulnerable points and, in case of need, vital points; the protection of points or lines of communication; freeing points or lines of communication which an enemy may have captured; and limited combat operations aimed at fixing and destroying the enemy in a region to be determined.

The objective of these operations is achieved when the installations in the vulnerable and vital points can function or perform their role without any interference by the enemy and when freedom of movement within the country is ensured.

#### The DMT and NATO

However, the DMT also plays an international role. Forces committed to the DMT under Belgian command provide substantial assistance to NATO by keeping open lines of communication within Belgian territory. It thus provides to some extent the rear area security of allied forces engaged in combat in Germany.

#### Reconnaissance Unit's Mobile Role

Brussels VOX in French 30 Oct 86 p 7

[Article by Philippe Servaty: "Active Duty at Vielsalm for the 942nd Light Reconnaissance Squadron"]

[Text] In our previous edition (VOX, Issue No 28), we spoke of the 941st Light Reconnaissance Squadron. This time we are speaking of the 942nd Light Reconnaissance Squadron. Both of them are part of the 16th Lancers, which itself belongs to the 9th Namur Provincial Regiment.

This second recall of reservists to active duty also covered their activities in Vielsalm, in the 3ChA [3rd Army Corps Area], as has been the custom since the beginning of 1986 for units assigned to the military defense of Belgium (DMT).

Practicing their military reflexes once again and familiarizing themselves with the techniques and tasks assigned to reconnaissance squadrons under the DMT program were among the week's activities for the 100 or so reservists called to active duty in Vielsalm.

On 20 October unit cadre personnel under the command of Major (Reserves) Romain responded to the orders given them. Unfortunately, they did not have particularly good luck. A storm and flurries of rain were their daily lot during this first week of their period of active duty.

After the rain came good weather: the men of the unit, when they arrived for service on 24 October, had the good fortune to see the truth of this old saying. The sun reappeared. Activities therefore began under the best of circumstances.

Major (Reserves) Romain said: "Motivation and morale are the two essential conditions for the success of any active duty period for reservists. Beginning in 1986 in units assigned to the DMT, officers and non-commissioned officers have been required to live and eat their meals in the quarters and mess halls of the troops. I entirely support this new directive. There is no doubt that it encourages great cohesion among all of the reservists called to active duty. Moreover, this arrangement did not take long to bring good returns. For example, marching in step, coming to a halt, and about facing, which require many hours of 'drill' during the period of training of members of the militia were reassimilated by my reservists in a quarter of an hour. I had never seen that before!"

The rest of the program was similar to that. A weekend was spent, reviewing the few basic notions which any soldier must know (how to stand guard; chemical, biological, and nuclear training; how to move across country; and so forth), and the properly "reconnaissance" part of the program then began. However, first of all the five reconnaissance platoons and the sharpshooter platoon were introduced to firing the FM, the .30 caliber rifle, the Vigneron, and the SAFN at Lagland Camp in Stockem.

Then the bivouac period made it possible to simulate combat conditions, thanks to exercises under operational conditions, based simultaneously on the friendly situation--on Belgian territory--and the enemy situation--presence of intruders or foreign troops.

Three kinds of maneuvers were emphasized:

- Surveillance of 'LOC' (Lines of Communication), that is: reconnoitering and conducting surveillance of a territory, in this case, covering 500 square kilometers (Bastogne-La Roche-Barvaux-Erzee) in support of other units;
- Specific surveillance of certain vulnerable points: railway lines, electricity lines, etc;
- Finally, cordoning off objectives; encircling a portion of territory infested by the enemy and checking ways of exfiltrating personnel.

These 3 days in bivouac subjected the nerves to a harsh test. The men were likely to be attacked at any moment. Therefore, a total blackout was required at night.

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CSO: 3619/16

## MILITARY SERVICE ATTRACTIVE TO YOUTH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Nov 86 p 2

[Article by Bo Draebel: "Youth Glad to Be Soldiers"]

[Text] Eighty-seven percent of the country's recruits at this moment are volunteers. Only three percent are against compulsory military service. Four percent went from unemployment to the armed forces. Two years ago 17 percent were unemployed when they were called up.

Declining unemployment among youth and a lengthened term of service have paradoxically enough had a positive effect on the recruitment of voluntary conscripts. Eighty-seven percent of the conscripts who were called up at the same time as Crown Prince Frederik on 16 October are true volunteers.

This is shown by a poll, taken by the Armed Forces Center for Leadership during 17 to 23 October, of the nine service areas: the Royal Life Guard, Hovelte; the Danish Life Regiment, Vordingborg; the Prince's Life Regiment, Viborg; the Zealand Life Regiment, Slagelse; the Jutland Dragoon Regiment, Holstebro; the Hussar Guard Regiment, Naestved; the Bornholm Service, Ronne; the Jutland Engineers Regiment, Randers; and the Zealand Engineers Regiment, Farum.

The poll is based on answers by 1875 recruits, equaling a response percentage of 97.7.

Half of the 87 percent whom the poll calls true volunteers report that they joined quite simply because they wanted to be soldiers. Part of them with the desire to go further in the armed forces as officers, sergeants or enlisted privates, and others to qualify for jobs in the police, fire-fighting service and salvage corps.

Some also stated as the reason for their voluntariness that they want to get the training, discipline and professional and personal growth which military service can provide. The need for a break from school or a sabbatical is also named as one of the reasons.

Of the 13-percent involuntary conscripts it is only three percent who have something against having to do their compulsory military service. Of this

three percent only one percent of the recruits give ideological reasons or a distaste for the military system as an explanation of their aversion to being called up. The two percent explain their dislike by interruption of their education, occupation or family life.

The Armed Forces Center for Leadership conducted a similar poll in 1984. At that time 71 percent were voluntary conscripts and 17 percent of those called up were unemployed at the time. The new poll shows that only four percent applied to the armed forces because they were unemployed.

8831

CSO: 3613/26

## DISPUTE OVER PRICE OF NEW FRIGATES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Nov 86 p 12

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Armed Forces Deny Operating Expenses of 300 million kroner for Frigates"]

[Text] It is not correct when the Social Democratic Party's defense policy spokesman says that the frigates cost 300 million kroner a year. The correct figure is 90 million kroner, the Armed Forces Command says.

"It is not correct when the Social Democratic Party's defense policy spokesman, Knud Damgaard, claims that operation of the navy's two largest units, the frigates 'Peder Skram' and 'Herluf Trolle', costs 300 million kroner a year," the Armed Forces Command declares.

"The correct figure is 90 million kroner," Armed Forces Command Information Chief, Lieutenant Colonel O.L.Kandborg says.

Knud Damgaard insisted to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE yesterday that "the operating expenses for the frigates--for fuel, wages and maintenance--according to the information I have had verified by people who know about these things, amount to about 300 million kroner."

The frigates are one of the central issues in the debate concerning the forward defense in the Baltic. The opponents, primarily Knud Damgaard and the circle of supporters of the so-called nonaggressive defense, consider them "a dangerous provocation," while the supporters consider them necessary for crisis management, first and foremost by virtue of their staying power at sea, and as irreplaceable weapons platforms.

## Missiles and Small Vessels

Damgaard and Co. think that they can be replaced by land-based and airborne missiles, as well as by smaller, non-provoking, vessels like, among others, the new Standard Flex 300 boats, the first of which is in the completion-of-construction stage at Aalborg Shipyard.

"The expenses for maintaining the present readiness with one frigate with a full crew and one with a so-called key crew amount to 90 million kroner a

year. As of January 1987 both frigates will have to be content with key personnel, in accordance with the current defense compromise. After this the expenses will be reduced to 55 million kroner a year," the Armed Forces Command's spokesman says.

"The decision regarding providing frigates with just key crews will in the long term have serious consequences for the navy," the chief of the Naval Operations Command, Rear Admiral Jorgen Bork, declares, and adds: "It will henceforth be impossible for Denmark to take part in NATO'S naval forces, which is of great importance for the demonstration of mutual solidarity on the world's oceans, and in the course of a very short time there will be a shortage of trained crews--both draftees and professionals--to man the ships in time of war."

8831

CSO: 3613/26

## ARMY CHIEF ON EMERGING RESERVE MANPOWER, TRAINING CONCEPT

Bonn LOYAL in German Sep 86 pp 12-15

[Interview with Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, conducted by Ruediger Moniac and Inge Dose-Krohn at the Ministry of Defense, date not given: "We Have Only One Army"]

[Text] Two reservists stand behind every soldier on active duty. This fact must be impressed upon military leaders, politicians, and the public. Intensive discussions with organizations and clubs of the free economy should result in better acceptance of military exercises. Certain parts of the army will assume a degree of defense availability similar to that of the active force. Reservist training must be considerably improved. Officers must be given greater authority. This is the thrust of statements made in an interview with Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, conducted by Ruediger Moniac and Inge Dose-Krohn at the Ministry of Defense.

[Question] In the future even more than today, the army will need its reserve soldiers to attain full operational readiness in case of an emergency. Do you have any exact figures on the extent to which dependence upon the reservists will increase?

[Answer] Yes, there is an order of magnitude, as well as some historical background. In German armies of the past, the ratio of active personnel to reservists amounted to roughly 1:4--in other words, upon mobilization the army consisted of about 80 percent reservists. In today's army the ratio is roughly 1:2. Thus there are two reservists behind every active duty soldier, which means that the army's peacetime strength is about 70 percent of its mobilization strength. During the 1990's we will be forced into greater dependence upon mobilization. Active duty strength will be reduced somewhat; mobilization strength will be increased by the share of wartime host nation support.

[Question] Can this be expressed in precise figures?

[Answer] There will be about 320,000 extended duty soldiers and draftees. The difference between that and the mobilization strength of about 1 million will therefore amount to barely 700,000.



[Question] In this context, could you compare 2 brigade of the field army and the territorial army, and also the way they will differ now and in the future?

[Answer] We will maintain the so-called principle of a graduated active force, because our defense system is a function of the geographic situation and the nature of the threat. In our central European "front situation" we will not deviate from a relatively large armed force. This is particularly true for the brigades, which must be available early on for forward defense, even in a scenario containing only a short warning time period.

[Question] You are referring to field army brigades?

[Answer] To begin with, I am referring to all types of brigades. But certainly the field army brigades, where we are dealing with an integrated army--there can be no doubt about that. The differentiation between army and territorial army is sometimes a bit artificial.

[Question] What makes it artificial--why would you rather speak about a single army?

[Answer] Because there are no differences in training, sense of belonging, and mission in the organization of the future--at least in preparing the army for emergency situations. Differences emerge only in times of defense emergency as to assignment. We have one part of the army that is subordinate to NATO, and another part that fulfills its mission under national command. But basically it is a single army.

[Question] Specifically, the difference between the field army brigade and the home defense brigade?

[Answer] The so-called "active brigade," in its present form, depends to a much greater extent on mobilization than many people would believe. There are three categories in which the reservist plays an important role in the field army brigade even today. First, the manning, in a national emergency, of the so-called defense emergency billets. Second, we have a certain safety margin excess manning which exceeds the standard emergency manning authorization and which is called to active duty in that case. Third, the assignment of recruits who have not had their field training to companies charged with basic training functions. I might add that today's brigade requires roughly a 30 percent share of reservists in case of emergency, which is likely to increase even more. I cannot give you any specific figures on this. But this is obvious. Inasmuch as the dependence upon mobilization will increase in proportion to the smaller number of draftees available during the 1990's and our intention to maintain our operational readiness level for forward defense, I can state even today that there is no manpower pool where dependence on mobilization is heaviest today--at the end of the graduated operational readiness level, in the territorial army, or in the corps and division troops.

These are, therefore, not the areas on which I could draw in the requisite order of magnitude, if I wanted to maintain the viability of these forces that

are vital to defense. We will try, however, to keep reductions within the brigades at reasonable levels. Perhaps this can be done in a graduated manner. We are working on this at the moment.

[Question] After these broad-brush indications which you have described for the future, how about something specific? You spoke of organizational planning. What basic requirements does the army have, inasmuch as it will require greater numbers of reservists for a future reserve planning concept for the 1990's.

[Answer] The fact that there are two reservists behind every active duty soldier must be fully realized even today by all military commanders as well as by the politicians and the general public.

[Question] But that would be a psychological problem?

[Answer] Yes--but a very important one for dealing with practical problems. Also, we must elaborate a mobilization model that will provide a degree of readiness to those parts of the territorial army of special importance in deployment (security elements or the traffic control organization of the military police), which would make them nearly as operationally ready as the active troops.

[Question] In other words, a problem of timing?

[Answer] Yes. And here is something else that the politicians must realize: The more mobilization-dependent an army becomes, the more it depends on timely political decisions. Thus greater mobilization dependence restricts political freedom of action to a certain extent, because certain decisions must be made early on if defense readiness is to be achieved.

[Question] But how do you expect to overcome this problem in actual practice? If you aim for a greater readiness status for nonactive forces approaching that of the operationally ready troops, more reservists must become available more quickly. You cannot dispatch motorcycle messengers to each one for personal delivery of their induction notices?

[Answer] In the age of the media and electronic communications, that should be the least of our problems. A much greater problem will be to establish organizational means within the structure that will enable us to let the troops, after being alerted, become homogeneous rather than to merely assemble--to have functioning units and forces available within a short time.

[Question] Specifically, what would such an organization look like?

[Answer] We are working on this just now. I can give you only a general idea of it. One possibility is an attempt to assign the reservists as close to their home location as possible and thus to increase their availability. It would appear that such a regional approach would result in better motivation and greater cohesion within the units. This would further require that we improve the training status of the reservists, especially that of their leaders, and that through promotion, training, and motivation these leaders would assume true responsibility for their elements, units, or formations.

This means in addition that despite the personnel shortage, we are trying to increase the percentage of active duty cadre personnel in the reserve commands. And this may further exacerbate shortages in the active duty force. To give you an example, a motorized infantry battalion in a home defense regiment is at the present time an equipment holding unit. In peacetime it consists merely of one company sergeant major, one noncommissioned officer, and a few inventory clerks. Our idea is to enlarge the cadre of such home defense regiments even now. Here we are trying to figure out how the present training organization could be integrated into these cadres in such a way that they would simultaneously constitute the cadres of the home defense regiments which exist in peacetime. But at the same time we would have to design the manpower allocation in such a way that, for instance, a motorized infantry regiment consisting of three battalions would have about one operational, or nearly operational, motorized infantry battalion in peacetime.

We have a shortage in the infantry MOS [Military Occupation Specialty]. As a result of the chasm existing between the peacetime structure and the mobilization structure, we produce too many tank soldiers and artillerymen who come from operational units. But we train too few "light infantrymen." Should we therefore be successful in finding a structure in which this cadre could be augmented, this would provide the regiment with a firm peacetime operational nucleus around which it could grow in mobilization exercises and of course in case of a national emergency. At the same time, it would serve as a training organization that would produce a greater number of the scarce infantry MOS than has been the case to date.

[Question] Wouldn't it make sense then to let these units engage in military exercises as units, and while you have that operationally ready battalion, you could also include the two skeleton crew battalions in appropriate exercises as units?

[Answer] Our objective is to create a training and exercise system that will make it possible not only to train individual reservists or small elements, but also to conduct large-scale maneuvers. At the same time, we want to change the rhythm of exercise programming. A new directive will permit us to use the so-called short-term defense exercise more frequently. This is used primarily for the purpose of securing and improving preparatory measures for such exercises for command and operational personnel.

[Question] Let me come back to the scarce MOS's. Is the motorized infantry regiment that you spoke of supposed to train infantry soldiers itself, or are these men cross-trained into the infantry MOS, after having served as a tank soldier in basic training and then transferred to the motorized infantry regiment, perhaps during the last few months of their basic training?

[Answer] You are touching on another subject that we are looking at. We have to give some thought to the extended basic training time--to what optimum use we can put it. We want to do this in two areas: First, the "green" training--general indoctrination--is to be improved. It will not always be possible to use three full months for basic training and only then to begin specialist training, because we have once again returned to replenishment by

unit, while still obligated to replenish more than 50 percent per quarter. This constraint applies to the specialist troops, such as communication specialists. If a soldier is assigned to a communications battalion after 3 months of service, he should already have the basic preparation for the specialized training areas which are addressed there. This makes a 3-month, packaged "green" training period more difficult. Be that as it may, in one package or in two, the share of the so-called general training subjects is to be increased, so that we can give to every soldier a double MOS--for instance, his special one as an armored infantry soldier and, upon completion, the MOS security soldier.

Second--and this will be the most difficult because of the variation in requirements--we must make use of the end of the obligatory service by specifically preparing the soldier for his mobilization assignment. And during this time special attention must be paid to leadership training, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Quality will often make the difference. As a superior, he must prove himself in a military exercises and certainly in a national emergency--a situation that is more difficult than commanding young draftees in the active duty army. Acquiring the necessary prerequisites and capabilities will be an essential key to success.

[Question] You have said that we are training too many soldiers to be tank crews. What happens in the field army if, for instance, a tank crew is lost? How would you replace it if most of those who were trained for this are now being "converted" to security soldiers?

[Answer] Obviously, we cannot do this to the point where we suddenly are out of tank soldiers. There must be specific planning involving the available reserve contingent. Thus the career management of the reservist will assume central importance. It must manage him equally in his training periods and in his assignment planning, taking into account also his civilian occupation and such acquired proficiencies as active leadership.

But this is also true for our requirements for reserve tank soldiers, for example. First of all, alternate crews are provided in the Organization and Equipment Table of any tank company. A surplus is required in this case, which must of course be provided. Such alternate crews are among the soldiers to be called to active duty with an active brigade in an emergency. Tank soldiers are also found in field replacement battalions, mobilization replacement battalions, and in the manpower reserve.

[Question] But wouldn't this raise a motivation problem, since there are more trained tank soldiers than are needed in this cushion? How do you explain to one of them that he will continue to be a tank soldier, and to the other that he has to become a security soldier?

[Answer] This is of course an operational question. I believe that regionalization will be most helpful here. If I can tell a soldier that he will now become a security soldier, but in a unit close to home, this would surely make up for it, especially if he were to be given special training for that function. Then he would not feel that he has been misassigned. This will also

increase his motivation. But the problem is much greater with some of our young reserve officers. While on active duty, they have trained with a tank battalion and have close ties to it. They would of course prefer to continue to serve in that battalion as a platoon officer as a reservist. And we have to tell those people: You were a superlative tanker, but in your mobilization assignment you will nevertheless command a security platoon.

[Question] This will dash the hopes of the men concerned....

[Answer] Of course. But that is a leadership and training problem. The significance of the mission must not be lost from view. And that is why personnel management is so important.

[Question] That sounds good and is certainly valid, general. But how can personnel management take on such a tremendous task? Can it really be expected to conduct individual planning for 1.5 million men, including army reserve personnel, in a way that will ensure that every element has the right man in the right place at the right time?

[Answer] This has to be approached from two sides. First, of course, from headquarters. Fortunately they have the computer facilities to deal with the quantitative problem. In addition, the responsible commander of an inactive force, be he a regimental, battalion, or company commander, must be capable of exerting his authority in the manning of his unit, especially in the periods between military exercises.

[Question] Would weekend exercises be appropriate for this?

[Answer] Yes. Also, he must be authorized to receive certain information and to give his own input concerning such matters as changes in programming that may have become necessary for one reason or another.

[Question] These commanders you are talking about--can they, or should they, be reservists also?

[Answer] Certainly.

[Question] In other words, such a reservist could do his personnel programming from his desk at home?

[Answer] If he is willing to do so and if he, as a commander, is given the proper authority, which is still under discussion. I don't see why not. It has been done before. I believe this is a large area of endeavor that we can deal with successfully only if the reservist commander assumes greater responsibility himself, and that he is given such responsibilities; in other words, if he is given appropriate authority.

[Question] And if he had greater authority, this in turn could lead to greater motivation on his part?

[Answer] I hope so. But this also means that we must provide him with the requisite proficiency, knowledge, and training.

[Question] This brings us to the civilian environment. How does the army think it can coordinate those increased demands on its reservists with the desires and needs of the economy, which also needs their skills?

[Answer] If a reservist concept is elaborated, it must be tailored to the specific requirements of the services and reduced to specific structures. This is followed by input from the Management and Legal Department, which works closely with us, concerning such matters as defense monitoring, calling reservists to active duty, and planning for the district selective service boards. The concept does of course need support by the politician, who should advocate its broad aims before the general public. If planning is accepted by the political leadership and becomes law, we must next conduct intensive discussions with industry, chambers of commerce, unions, and guilds to gain their acceptance and jointly arrive at the type of exercise forms and means of calling reservists to active duty which are likely to gain approval in the economy. The Reservists' Association also has a role to play in this. We must all work on it.

[Question] You are saying that the Reservists' Association must help in informing the public about the need for supporting an increased number of military exercises. What else can it do to help?

[Answer] It has always had the mission of working with the public, promoting motivation and popularizing the reservist concept. Now, if it wishes to and organizes itself accordingly, it can help in actual indoctrination. There are already in existence working groups of reserve officers and noncommissioned officers where advanced tactical training is possible. The question remains as to whether or not it might be possible for particularly enthusiastic reservists to serve in an official capacity, somewhat like volunteer firemen, as the nucleus of a regional unit.

[Question] Would the army remunerate the volunteer activities of such reservists, and, if so, in what form?

[Answer] I cannot tell you in what form. But some form of remuneration would certainly be necessary.

[Question] Such reservists would no doubt expect promotion also.

[Answer] Most likely. There are a number of possibilities. While this has probably not been done to a sufficient extent to date, a man's development in his civilian occupation must be considered as one of the promotion criteria. Motivation can also depend on activities to be performed in reservist status that are somehow related to any achievements, accomplishments, and knowledge acquired in one's civilian occupation. We are giving some thought to this. I believe that a group of enthusiastic reservists is always a great motivator, and that it can be a big factor in such units as a home defense company.

[Question] Would you wish for more enthusiasm in the entire FRG, such as, for example, is the case with the lectures in Hammelburg, in which members of the Association from North Rhine-Westphalia are the main participants?

[Answer] These model lectures entitled "Reservists Train Reservists" are a good start. But care must be taken to ensure that this model is used to elaborate a concept that has wide applicability.

[Question] All these items--the reserve concept, restructuring, finding wide applicability for a model--don't you feel that all this takes a tremendous amount of time; that the politicians, when confronted with a need for decision, drag their feet? That all this requires time that we have just about exhausted?

[Answer] I do not believe that there is not sufficient time available for this. We will of course have to act with great speed during the next few years. The year 1990 is not that far away. Our objective is that by the end of 1987 at the latest we will have more than the basic outline--specifically, a structural skeleton.

[Question] Couldn't this be speeded up a bit?

[Answer] One year is a short time for a project of this magnitude. Things have to be evaluated very carefully.

[Question] But we didn't just learn about them yesterday!

[Answer] No. But we have only recently started to deal with structural studies. They will have to be tested. I believe there is enough time available for this. However, we will eventually have a need for decisions that will require a concentrated effort.

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## BUNDESTAG TRIMS NAVY'S PLANS FOR THIRD FLEET AUXILIARY SHIP

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by "FY": "Naval Procurement Proposal"]

[Text] Bonn, 26 Oct--The efforts of the government to obtain parliamentary approval for the expeditious construction of a third fleet auxiliary ship, at a cost of DM200 million, and to give the construction contract for this vessel to the Flensburg shipyards (due to the recent bankruptcy of the Harmstorff Group, the previous contract recipient) have been blocked by the Bundestag's budget committee. The awarding of this adjunct contract should enable the New Flensburg Shipbuilding Company to obtain DM60 million following the bankruptcy of Harmstorff as initial contractor, and this should be a significant impetus for the economic survival of the Flensburg firm. Schleswig-Holstein has announced a fulfillment guarantee for the three vessels in order to ensure the award of the contract to Flensburg. The district thereby assumes any additional costs that could result in the event of the closing of the Flensburg shipyard, despite receiving this contract, and the subsequent awarding of further work to another company.

In spite of the Schleswig-Holstein declaration, the Bundestag budget committee was not in a position to grant its approval for the contract. Despite Schleswig-Holstein's guarantee, the committee inserted a demand that the economic condition of the shipyard be reviewed. Committee members feared that the new contracting firm lacks sufficient resources to fulfill the contract and that extending them DM60 million from the defense budget this year could amount to an expenditure without a corresponding productive output from the contractor, leaving the country and taxpayers bearing the expense of the three auxiliary vessels and not have the ships in action.

For many years the navy has maintained three fleet auxiliary ships (the "Oste," "Alster," and "Oker"). Each is an aging ship, the oldest of which was built in World War II. These ships are used primarily for radar reconnaissance, and they are chiefly deployed in the central and eastern part of the Baltic Sea. Three ships are necessary to guarantee that one of them is always operational. In spite of this uncontested need, the navy, due to a lack of funds, was compelled to reduce its fleet auxiliary ships to just two because of the continuous renovation of its fleet auxiliary vessels. Construction of a third ship was not foreseen until 1996.



The hurriedly proposed new construction was drawn up on the assumption that the two-ship concept is no longer tenable due to the increased threat in the northern waters, which requires a greater geographical separation of the deployed fleet auxiliary ships, including covering areas beyond the Baltic Sea. Until the new vessel is built, the navy wishes to keep one of the older ships operational. Because there are no funds for the construction of a Type-423 fleet auxiliary ship in the current budget, the Defense Ministry, with the approval of the parliamentary finance minister, suggested appropriating as yet unused revenues from the aircraft construction budget--DM40 million--and another DM20 million from the funds originally earmarked for the Alpha jet.

Chancellor Kohl personally intervened over the weekend in order to defuse the dramatically portrayed weak condition of the German shipbuilding industry. According to sources in Bonn, Kohl made an effort to have the American shipping company "American President Lines" order three of the largest and fastest container ships in the world (each with a net displacement of 41,250 tons and a speed of 24 nautical miles per hour) from the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche shipbuilding company in Kiel. Two other ships were to be ordered in the future. This contract has a total value of about DM1 billion. This would ensure 1,000 jobs in Kiel for the next 2 years.

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## REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL LAND CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORTS URGED

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 21 Oct 86 p 32

[Article by Jochen von Arnim, press spokesman for Federal Office for Civil Defense: "No Contradiction to Peace Negotiations"]

[Excerpt] Civil defense is mandatory until the time that all political conflict has been outlawed throughout the world. Moreover, civil defense in no way conflicts with any significant and worthwhile efforts to maintain and propagate peace.

But how can civil defense--its practice, not the concept--be facilitated? The following points should be a basis for stimulating suggestions and discussions on this topic.

1. The three-way division into civil defense (as a counterpart to military defense), civil protection (as one of four aspects of protecting the civilian population), and protection against catastrophes (as one of seven types of civil defense in general) is justified in a formal sense, but in practice has proven less useful.

## Table

| a) Total Defense                                     | b) Civil Defense as Part of Defense in General* |
|--|---|
| Military Defense                                     | Total Defense                                   |
| Civil Defense  | Civil Defense                                   |
| 1. Maintenance of state and governmental functioning | Civil Protection                                |
| 2. Civil defense                                     | - Shelter construction                          |
| 3. Supply  | - Warning service                               |
| 4. Armed forces support                              | - Catastrophe protection                        |
| Civil defense  | - Health office                                 |
| Shelter construction                                 | - Self Defense                                  |
| Warning service                                      | - Duration controls                             |
| Catastrophe protection                               | - Cultural preservation                         |
| Self defense   |   |
| Health office  |   |
| Duration controls                                    |   |
| Cultural preservation                                |   |

\*) simplified depiction as part of the civil defense from various key missions

A well known Bonn journalist has caricatured the situation as follows: no grass grows wherever Germans think over a problem! Thus civil defense as a concept should be replaced as soon as possible by an appropriate protective means against catastrophes (when "environmental protection" signifies the protection of the environment, then "catastrophic protection" can only refer to protection from natural disasters). Other alternative concepts include defense against dangerous conditions and emergency care.

2. The division of civil defense within the Federal Interior Ministry should result at the very least in the supplementary designation of catastrophic protection or dangerous conditions protection. The Federal Office for Civil Defense in Bonn-Bad Godesberg should therefore be renamed the Federal Office for Protection Against Catastrophes or the Federal Office for Emergency Care, comparable to the U.S. Emergency Planning Office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, respectively.

3. The mission of the Federal Interior Ministry and for its subordinate Federal Office must be reformulated to some extent. Responsibility for defense against external threats to Germany must lie with the federal office.

#### New Concepts Would Be Useful

Dangerous conditions and injuries originating from domestic situations that affect more than one province within Germany should become the responsibility of the Federal Ministry for the duration of the state of danger or the period during which damage is being dealt with, as long as such is required. The coordination of measures to combat hazards facing several provinces could be dealt with most reasonably at the federal level.

4. In this sense, then, the federal office would be equipped to deal with more assignments in the planning and execution of executive directives.

5. Under any circumstances, the private and public population would be informed and provided with specific, reasonable suggestions via a manual or a spokesman regarding the most significant dangers and injury potential as well as the means to combat the threats. A manual would have to be given to every household, and no essential information could be omitted from it in order to preserve its credibility.

6. The Warning Service must be technically modernized more than it presently is.

7. Construction of shelters should become a public obligation, as it is to some extent in other nations, and not a private undertaking as some would propose. If the administration implemented some effective shelter construction, private individuals would be more understanding of the public role and would also probably be more motivated to undertake construction of their own than if individuals were compelled by law to do so.

The growth rate of federal construction is significant. Furthermore, it is presumably simpler politically for construction responsibility to rest in public hands via a new civil defense law than to burden the private economy with such a program.

8. The NBC defense should be strengthened. The number of existing NBC platoons must be increased as soon as possible as the first new construction phase. This must be carried out to such an extent that in every district, including those of cities lacking a district political unit, at least one platoon would be available and completely outfitted. All members of catastrophe protection units should be equipped with protective masks.

9. The Repair Service should be further reinforced and, through additional equipment and more intensive training, work more closely with energy producers and municipal public works.

10. The leadership cadre of the catastrophic protection unit must be extensively enlarged beyond the platoon level toward its upper ranks.

11. There should be an occupational branch of civil defense and catastrophe defense with corresponding ties to the federal office, with such branches in provinces and townships as well as among the top administrative personnel of assistance organizations. At the same time, the speciality of public defense should be taught in trade schools and universities, since only in this way can one produce effective specialists in the field. That which we expect of every physician in terms of appropriate education should also be expected of every individual chiefly responsible for catastrophe defense.

In any event, the example that should not be followed is the one set by the Netherlands, where the civil defense has recently been assumed by the fire departments and the Red Cross (compared with the state staff of 112 on 16 June 1986).

Defense against public hazards and injuries depends primarily on the quality of the means dealing with these situations. Therefore, whoever believes in saving revenues should do this first in terms of quantity. Otherwise one could easily fall into the threat of creating a catastrophe of the pocketbook.

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## PURPOSE, ROLES OF ARMY RESERVES OUTLINED

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French Sep/Oct 86 pp 33-35

["Abridged version" of speech by General Boissau, Inspector of Reserve Forces and of the mobilization of the ground forces, and representing the Ministry of Defense at the 54th National Congress of the National Union of Reserve Officers]

[Excerpts] Thus, faced with the dangerous international situation, and within exacting financial restrictions, the government's intention is indeed to increase France's defense capability; however, France's capability does not rest solely upon the quantity and quality of its weapons or, according to a well-known phrase, on the solidity of its walls. France's capability also rests particularly upon the will, generosity and courage of its citizens, who are proud to be a part of France and are capable of giving their all to her.

At this time, it is right, therefore, that I take up the second subject close to your hearts--what will be the place of the reserve forces in the defense concept to which the forthcoming law will give form?

Three different facts bring me to say that this role will remain important.

First of all, steps should be taken to take stock of and to comply with French traditions. Since the epic of the revolutionary wars, the rising of the masses in 1793 and the promulgation in 1798 of the Jourdan law establishing conscription, each time that the country's very existence has been threatened, the French armies have conquered the enemy only when they combine regular army personnel, who are professionally serving the country, with a larger contingent drawn from the population, which indicates the latter's devotedness to its independence.

The second argument pertains more to the financial aspect. A regular army is very expensive. From an economical point of view, it is necessary to place "in reserve," i.e., to call to serve only in the event of a highly tense situation, all those military components whose operational capabilities do not imply a permanent existence.

All of today's armies recognize the reserves to be inexpensive, including those reserves not dependent upon conscripted personnel. This is all the more reason for nations whose youth are called up for active military service not to ignore the resources among educated as well as trained personnel nor to ignore the highly specialized competence that is useless to the army in peace time but is necessary in a war. We have neither the ways nor the need to maintain in peace time all the forces required during a war.

The bringing of the reserves into play is further justified by one's concern in handling a major crisis. The call to arms of the reserves is called mobilization. It is a clear warning signal, evidence of a nation's cohesiveness and determination. It is an important prelude to the engagement of traditional forces, and it is an important introduction to the final warning. It is the first note struck in the gamut of deterrence.

One may wonder whether today's reserves' organizations, their training, the delays in setting up the units they are to serve in, do indeed respond to needs. You yourselves have, by the voice of those who represent you in the Council for the Study of the Reserves, stressed that the government and military leaders seek means for greater efficiency. You, Mr Chairman, have, once again, just made reference to this concern.

The objective is clearly set out in two parts. On the one hand, it is necessary for the reservists slated to fill out the active units to be able to join, within the allotted time, the formations to which they are assigned and to be prepared to carry out, within these formations, the tasks they have been given. On the other hand, it is necessary that the units set up at the time of mobilization be operational within the shortest possible time.

The official statements issued by the Council for the Study of the Reserves, which the minister had studied, demonstrate that in order to attain this double objective, it is necessary, by retaining the positive experience, such as the derivation and teachings of the former plans, to reconsider our reserves and our mobilization in the light of the following principal ideas:

- a valorization of equipment according to the criterion relating to its adaptability to the mission, and to clearly defined priorities. This valorization creates a better distribution of available military materiel and also a more refined requisition system aimed at providing the civilian vehicles that actually correspond to the needs;
- a training policy adapted to budgetary requirements, which implies the cancellation of call-ups that are of no real benefit to mobilization or of an average efficiency/cost ratio, and the transfer of corresponding funds based upon better studied and more beneficial actions, by striving to control the qualifications of cadre personnel who are close to the troops--non-commissioned officers, lieutenants, and captains--together with the specialists whose skill must be maintained.

- finally, a mobilization that makes use of all modern organization and communications procedures that will be tested, by random selection, to determine the effect upon the call-up of personnel, requisition of vehicles, and the activation of the units.

Without undue emphasis, the Council for the Study of the Reserves found that although the motivation of the reserves resulted, most certainly, from the tasks and resources assigned to them, but also resulted from the mental and physical conditions of their activities. It involves allowances and protection against occupational hazards; it involves especially how the nation views them, and closer to home, how their employer or their place of business views them. These are extremely important factors that have a bearing on the effectiveness of the reserve forces.

This leads quite naturally to a third subject that is important to you--the role of the Reserve Associations, particularly the Reserve Officers Associations united with the UNOR [National Union of Reserve Officers].

It is a four-fold role.

First of all, the Government and the military command have entrusted these organizations with the position of consultant. The lodging of complaints does not exist in the army. The protection of an individual's interests is the responsibility of the military commander. The world of the reserves is spread so thinly throughout the nation's fabric, human contact so sporadic, dependent upon too few call-ups, that it is normal for the various command levels to be informed by associative representation of the problems peculiar to reserve cadres. At the national level, it is the role of the Council for the Study of the Reserves to bring together around the defense minister the chairmen, or their representatives, of the large unions and federations.

The Council for the Study of the Reserves will convene as soon as programming work is sufficiently advanced and will include all the decisionmakers involved, in order to strengthen the ties between the armed forces and those who in the nation best understand the greatness of it and the obligations to it.

Your associations fulfill an auxiliary role for the military command. The reserves have no justification except for one objective: to hold their ground during a conflict. Their mobilization and training are the responsibility of the territorial command. But often the latter, because the military has given up some regions or parts thereof, and also because of circumstances--referring to the 1950s and 1960s--are stripped of resources. Your help is needed. The cadre personnel of the CEPR [not further identified] and military preparations, the organization of reserve activities that contribute to the training and to the maintenance of the moral and physical condition of personnel, through assembly meetings and competitive examinations, are your responsibility and affect those who are of an age to have a mobilization assignment. The military command trusts you--work together with your comrades in the regular army, who will then be able to identify their best auxiliary troops.

There is yet another magnificent task that falls to you. One that forms an integral part of the work to restore civic pride and patriotism, which we all wish for, in the search for a firm attachment of the nation to its army. It is up to all your members, the young and not so young, commissioned by your associations, on their own initiative to seize every opportunity to serve France by spreading all around them, within their family, in their professional circles, in their housing development, their love of country and their desire to defend it. I should wish that they have their hearts set particularly on convincing young people that military service, far from being a digression in one's life, is making oneself available to the nation as a whole to prepare its defense and, should the occasion arise, to be ready to participate in its defense. Of course, when I say "military service" I am thinking as much of "service in the reserves" as well as of "active duty service."

Finally, the armed forces always speak a language devoid of embellishment, which hinges on such words as mission, duty, discipline, training, sacrifice. It is necessary for men, and especially for young men, that there be a relaxed environment available to counterbalance the severe aspects of the military thing. It is up to reserve officer associations to build, for the benefit of their members, conviviality, a spirit of fellowship, a desire to help one another. At last, how many ways there are where it can be put to practice! I shall cite only one example in this period of unemployment--that is, give someone a job. I should wish, therefore, that your 260 Reserve Officers Associations be active, young, cheerful, attractive, and that they do everything possible so that being a reserve officer is as much a pleasure as it is a duty and an honor!

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## PHILIPS WILL SUPPLY ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT FOR FRIGATES

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[Text] Philips has won the international competition to supply electronic and radar equipment for Portuguese frigates thanks to a strategic option by Signaal, which refused to allow the two other competitors to offer radars on which it has the patent.

The Portuguese Navy's report on the radars being considered gave the technical advantage to Signaal, and that seems to have carried more weight in the final decision than the specific counterpart deals being offered by the various competitors (Signaal-Philips, Sperry-UNISYS, and Honeywell). In addition, the Dutch Government got involved in the operation by financing it through grants and in the form of favorable interest rates for our country. In the case of the American bidders, Sperry was promising \$143 million in counterpart deals, and Honeywell, regarded by authorities as a serious competitor, was prepared to step up its acquisition of materiel from INDEP [National Defense Industries], would have worked out an agreement with CENTREL, and, finally, would have invested in new technologies, all as part of an attractive package of counterpart deals.

The main shortcoming on the American side was the lack of financial support from the U.S. Government for financing the materiel. Not only was the balance remaining in Azorean counterpart funds exhausted--and the Americans had refused to increase it during Cavaco Silva's visit for that purpose--but it also was not possible to obtain new financial support.

Also decisive in this process was the firm stand on the part of Philips' negotiators, who refused from the beginning to supply the other bidders with the patent on Signaal radars. It should be recalled that Sperry had won in Spain by supplying Signaal radars.

That firm stand continued even when the counterpart deals being offered by Philips were said to be less favorable, but it was possible to renegotiate those deals so that they also covered the \$100 million that Portugal is going to invest in this project, with the added financial advantage of support by the Dutch Government.

As part of its counterpart deals, Philips is offering investment in Portugal and an expansion in its line of household white goods. It will also begin manufacturing its compact discs in Portugal while also investing in a software firm.